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INTRODUCTION
School finance litigation has become one of the primary tools of
education advocates to address the racial achievement gap and improve
educational opportunities for poor and minority children. It is only more
important in the wake of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, which
prohibits the use of race-based student assignment plans to integrate local
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school districts.' Yet even before the Supreme Court limited local dis-
tricts' options for racially integrating public schools, the focus of advo-
cates at the state level had largely turned away from racial integration
and toward money.2 Since 1973, lawsuits challenging state methods for
funding public schools have been brought in forty-five states. 3 Many of
the early suits focused on equity, claiming that reliance on the local prop-
erty tax to fund public education, coupled with varying property values
across a state, created vast disparities in funding available to local school
districts and violated state constitutional Equal Protection Clauses. 4
More recent cases have focused on adequacy, claiming that these funding
disparities mean that many districts cannot provide their students with
the education required under state constitutional Education Clauses. 5
Although school finance litigation relies on the power of courts to
create social change and to improve educational outcomes for individual
students, not enough is known about the power or desire of courts to
create such change in the face of legislative or popular opposition, or the
relationship between court action and actual change on the ground. This
Article explores this important issue through the lens of one state's expe-
rience with school finance litigation. By examining the legal, political,
and social history of school finance reform in Massachusetts through per-
sonal interviews with many of its most important players, this Article
reveals that before intervening in education reform, courts consider both
their own institutional capacity to produce change and the efforts made
by the elected branches of government to comply with the constitutional
mandate. This holds important implications for advocates seeking to use
the law to change educational outcomes and to produce any type of so-
cial reform.
I Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (U.S.
2007).
2 See, e.g., Tamar Lewin & David M. Herszenhorn, Money, Not Race, Is Fueling New
Push to Bolster Schools, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2007, at AIO.
3 See generally National Access Network: Litigation, http://www.schoolfunding.info/lit-
igation/litigation.php3 (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
4 See Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Re-
form, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 104-15 (1995).
5 Peter Enrich provides a nuanced explanation of the three "waves" in school finance
litigation. Id. According to Enrich, traditional equity claims are based solely on state Equal
Protection Clauses, arguing that the clauses forbid differences in the fiscal capacity of local
school districts. Id. at 106-07. Other equity claims are based on both state Education and
Equal Protection Clauses, arguing that the state Education Clause recognizes a fundamental
right to an education which cannot be violated by differences in district fiscal capacity. Id. at
107. Both types of suits claim a right to equal treatment: equal educational opportunity, equal
funding for education, or equal capacity to raise funds for education. Id. at 108. Traditional
adequacy claims are based on state Education Clauses and argue that students have a substan-
tive right to public schooling and that their constitutional right to education is being violated
by the poor quality of educational services in their districts. See id. at 108-10.
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In 1993, in McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office of Education,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that the Education
Clause of the Massachusetts constitution imposed an enforceable duty on
the Commonwealth "to provide education in the public schools for the
children there enrolled, whether they be rich or poor and without regard
to the fiscal capacity of the community or district in which such children
live." 6 It defined the constitutional duty by adopting seven capabilities
that an educated child must possess. 7 Three days after the court's deci-
sion, then-Governor William Weld signed the Education Reform Act of
1993 (ERA). 8 The Act provided for a massive, progressive refinancing
of public education in Massachusetts in exchange for high standards and
accountability from students, teachers, and schools. 9 In 1999, on the eve
of the full implementation of the progressive funding scheme, the
McDuffy plaintiffs filed for additional relief.' 0 They claimed that the
Commonwealth was still not providing them with the education required
by the Massachusetts constitution as defined by the seven McDuffy capa-
bilities."1 A superior court judge found that the plaintiff districts were
not providing students with the education to which they were constitu-
tionally entitled and recommended a costing-out study to determine how
much it would cost to provide all children with an adequate education.' 2
In Hancock v. Commissioner of Education, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court adopted the judge's findings and praised her report but
found that the Commonwealth was not violating its constitutional duty to
provide plaintiff children with an education.' 3
6 McDuffy v. Sec'y of Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 555 (Mass. 1993).
7 Id. at 554. These capabilities were originally declared in the famous Kentucky school
finance case, Rose v. Councilfor Better Education, 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989). They include:
"(i) sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable students to function in a com-
plex and rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and polit-
ical systems to enable students to make informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of
governmental processes to enable the student to understand the issues that affect his or her
community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her
mental and physical wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to
appreciate his or her cultural and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation for
advanced training in either academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to choose
and pursue life work intelligently; and (vii) sufficient level of academic or vocational skills to
enable public school students to compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding
states, in academics or in the job market." McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 554 (quoting Rose, 790
S.W.2d at 212).
8 Peter J. Howe, Weld Puts Lukewarm Pen to Education Reform Bill, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 19, 1993, at 1.
9 See infra Part I.B.2.
1o See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
I Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1145 (Mass. 2005).
12 Hancock ex rel. Hancock v. Driscoll (Botsford Report), No. 02-2978, 2004 WL
877984, at *143-45 (Mass. Super. Apr. 26, 2004).
13 Hancock, 822 N.E.2d at 1136-39.
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Part I of this Article provides a comprehensive social, political, and
legal history of school finance reform in Massachusetts, focusing prima-
rily on McDuffy, Hancock, and the ERA. This history reveals that the
Massachusetts school finance experience is unique in a number of re-
spects. First, McDuffy remains the only school finance case in the coun-
try to be decided on the basis of a stipulated factual record submitted by
the parties.14 Second, the ERA, which comprehensively reformed school
financing in the Commonwealth, was passed by the Massachusetts legis-
lature not in response to an order from the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court, but one week before McDuffy was even decided.' 5 The
McDuffy court was mindful of the legislative action and state legislators
were mindful of the court case; thus, the litigation and lobbying can only
be understood in concert. 16 Similarly, the Hancock court has not had the
last word on school funding or education reform. Current Massachusetts
Governor Deval Patrick expressed his commitment to reviewing the
school finance system while on the campaign trail and has recently an-
nounced education reform proposals that would be the system's biggest
overhaul since the ERA.' 7
Part II discusses three main factors that help explain the Hancock
decision. First, the court was aware of its own institutional constraints
and concerns regarding the judiciary's role.' 8 It intentionally chose not
to impose a remedial order that would require the legislature to appropri-
ate additional funds for education because it feared provoking inter-
branch conflict. The court was not concerned with constraints on courts
generally, but its particular constraints due to its own previous clashes
with the Massachusetts legislature over gay marriage and campaign fi-
nance reform, the difficulty of crafting remedies in school finance cases,
and the lack of political support for the plaintiffs' case. This explains the
second factor. The court's concerns regarding its judicial role reflected
its implicit, and correct, assumption that policy elites, the legislature, the
14 Alan Jay Rom, McDuffy Is Dead; Long Live McDuffy: Fundamental Rights Without
Remedies in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 21 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT.
111, 125 (2006).
15 See infra Part I.B.2.
16 See infra Part I.B.3.
17 See Maria Sacchetti, Governor Stirs UMass-Boston Graduates, They Cheer His Plan
for 2-Year Colleges, BOSTON GLOBE, June 2, 2007, at BI [hereinafter Sacchetti, Governor
Stirs Graduates]; Maria Sacchetti, Patrick Seeks Free Two-Year State Colleges, Goal is Key in
"Cradle to Career" Plan, BOSTON GLOBE, June 1, 2007, at Al; Lisa Wangsness, Patrick
Targets School Funding, Criticizes Reliance on Property Tax, BOSTON GLOBE, May 2, 2007,
at Al.
18 Robert Keogh, the editor of CommonWealth Magazine, picked up on this concern,
stating that the justices indicated that they did not want to get "bogged down" in the "quag-
mire" of issuing orders that they could not enforce. Audio recording: Hancock vs. Driscoll:
How Much is Enough, sponsored by MassINC (Dec. 9, 2004), available at http://forum.wgbh.
org/wgbh/forum.php?lecture-id= 1719.
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executive branch, and the public at large were generally uninterested in
investing substantial new money in underperforming school districts.
Stated otherwise, any fear of provoking inter-branch conflict or concern
regarding the implementation of a judicial remedy would have been irrel-
evant if there had been substantial political support for the remedies the
plaintiffs sought. Third, the court believed that the political branches had
acted in good faith to increase state spending, minimize funding dispari-
ties between districts, and improve education in plaintiff districts. 19 It
accepted the story, shared by many in the Commonwealth, that Massa-
chusetts schools had once been severely under-funded, but under the
ERA, which had been encouraged and influenced by McDuffy, state
spending on education had dramatically increased, disparities between
districts had been reversed or reduced, and remaining problems in un-
derperforming schools could no longer be traced to a lack of funds.
Part III discusses Hancock's important implications for the efficacy
of courts in producing social change and for plaintiffs contemplating
school finance lawsuits. A number of scholars, including Gerald Rosen-
berg and Michael Klarman, have suggested that courts cannot produce
significant social change in the face of popular opposition.20 Some
scholars have claimed that this is particularly true in the area of school
finance reform, where remedies such as increased funding for public
schools and programmatic improvements are notoriously difficult for
courts to enforce.21 McDuffy suggests partial, nuanced support for these
theories. While the McDuffy court cannot be credited with creating so-
cial change in the face of legislative or popular opposition, the existence
of the lawsuit influenced the ERA and the broader politics of education
reform in the Commonwealth, just as the decision was in turn influenced
by political action.22 Hancock, on the other hand, points in a direction
that has been less explored: regardless of a court's capacity to produce
social change, a court might be unwilling to produce change out of fear
of provoking inter-branch conflict if it believes that there is little support
for change within the political branches. This highlights the importance
of the interactive relationship between litigation and legislation, espe-
cially in the school finance context.
19 Audio tape: Oral Argument, Hancock, 822 N.E.2d 1134 (No. SJC-09267) [hereinafter
Audio tape of Hancock Oral Argument] (on file with author). During oral argument, Chief
Justice Margaret Marshall explicitly stated that the Massachusetts Department of Education
had proceeded in good faith. Id.
20 See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (1991); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004).
21 See e.g., William S. Koski, The Politics of Judicial Decision-Making in Education
Policy Reform Litigation, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1077 (2004).
22 Facts developed for the litigation, especially, helped to create an awareness of the
funding problem and a sense that something had to be done. See infra Part I.B.3.
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As for implications for future school finance litigation, Hancock
shows that courts may be unwilling to find constitutional liability in
states where the political branches have engaged in a serious, sustained
effort to improve education and reduce spending disparities between dis-
tricts. This is especially true when, like in Massachusetts, the effort has
been met with a fair amount of success state wide. Therefore, advocates
should be wary of bringing school finance suits in states where there is a
perception that the political branches have acted in good faith to fulfill
their constitutional obligations. This remains true even when students in
plaintiff districts fail to meet state standards and perform far below aver-
age on state performance evaluations.
Before offering a social, political, and legal history of school fi-
nance reform in Massachusetts, a brief introduction to the state's public
education is in order. Massachusetts has a population of approximately
6.3 million people and is divided into 351 cities and towns. 23 In the
2006-2007 school year, 968,661 students were enrolled in 389 operating
public school districts. 24 Of those students, 71.5% were white, 13.3%
were Hispanic, and 8.2% were African American.2 5 In addition, 16.9%
of students were enrolled in special education, and 28.9% were from low
income backgrounds. 26 At the time McDuffy was filed, the Common-
wealth provided 35.47% of all funding for public education, and local
cities and towns provided 60.42%.27 Massachusetts ranked seventh in
the nation in total per-pupil expenditures, but forty-third in the propor-
tion of education expenditures provided by the state. 28 Reliance on local
property taxes created huge disparities in per-pupil expenditures between
districts. In Fiscal Year (FY) 1991, the Town of Lincoln spent $9,567
per-pupil while the Town of Douglas spent $3,251.29
I. SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL HISTORY OF SCHOOL
FINANCE REFORM IN MASSACHUSETTS
A. THE EARLY YEARS
The Council for Fair School Finance (Council) was formed by the
Massachusetts "education establishment" in 1975 for the purpose of fil-
23 Citizen Information Service: Welcome to Massachusetts!, http://www.sec.state.ma.usl
cis/ciswel/weltomas.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
24 Massachusetts Department of Education, State Profile, http://profiles.doe.mass.edul
state.asp (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Stipulation of Agreed Facts at 37, McDuffy v. Sec'y of Executive Office of Educ., 615
N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993) (No. 90-128) [hereinafter Stipulation of Facts].
28 Brief for the Defendants at 30-31, McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d 516 (No. SJC 06128).
29 Brief for the Plaintiffs at 54, McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d 516 (No. SJC 06128).
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ing a state-level, school finance lawsuit. 30 The founding organizations
included the Massachusetts Federation of Teachers and the Massachu-
setts Teachers Association (the two state teachers unions), the Massachu-
setts Association of School Superintendents, and the Massachusetts
Association of School Committees. 31 The first suit was filed in 1978
under the caption Webby v. Dukakis.32 Almost immediately after the suit
was filed, the Massachusetts legislature responded by enacting the
"School Funds and State Aid for Public Schools Act," the first state-
wide, comprehensive school funding formula.33 The purpose of the Act
was "to promote the equalization of educational opportunities in public
schools of the Commonwealth. ' 34 Webby was then suspended to allow
the new funding scheme to take effect. 35
In 1980, the Massachusetts electorate approved Proposition 2 1h,
which significantly affected the ability of municipalities to raise revenues
through the local property tax. 36 One of the major effects of Proposition
2 /2 was severe funding reductions for school systems across the state. 37
The Webby parties initiated discovery in 1983, and in July of 1985, a
single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court for the County of Suffolk
referred Webby to a special master to hear evidence and make findings
and conclusions. 38 Later that month, the legislature responded again by
30 Interview with Norma Shapiro, President, Council for Fair School Finance, in Boston,
Mass. (Jan. 16, 2007 and Jan. 19, 2007) [hereinafter Shapiro Interview]. Ms. Shapiro origi-
nally became involved in the Council for Fair School Finance in the late 1970s. Id. She
became President of the Council in 1989 and continues to serve in that capacity today. Id.; see
also The Council for Fair School Finance in Massachusetts, http://www.aclu-mass.org/issues/
FairSchools/About.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2008).
31 Shapiro Interview, supra note 30.
32 McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 518.
33 See id.; see also Shapiro Interview, supra note 30.
34 Stipulation of Facts, supra note 27, at 15-16.
35 McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 518.
36 Stipulation of Facts, supra note 27, at 10-11; Kate Strickland, The School Finance
Reform Movement, a History and Prognosis: Will Massachusetts Join the Third Wave of Re-
form?, 32 B.C. L. REV. 1105, 1157 n.392 (1991) (noting that Proposition 2 1h sets a two and
one-half percent cap on the amount by which local taxes can be raised in a given year without
a special voter approval called an override).
37 MASSACHUSETTS BusLmss ALLIANCE FOR EDUCATION, EVERY CHILD A WINNER! A
PROPOSAL FOR A LEGISLATIVE ACTION PLAN FOR SYSTEMIC REFORM OF MASSACHUSETTS'
PUBLIC PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION SYSTEM 8 (July 1991) [hereinafter EVERY
CHILD A WINNER!].
38 McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 518. A brief explanation of Massachusetts's single justice
practice is in order. The Webby v. Dukakis suit and the McDuffy suit were both filed in the
Supreme Judicial Court for the County of Suffolk, the single justice court of the Common-
wealth. Id. The Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) has concurrent jurisdiction with the superior
court over equitable matters. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231A, § 1 (2007). Parties may file
cases originally with the SJC for the county of Suffolk, and the case is then referred to a single
justice of the SJC. See Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County, http://www.sjccountyclerk.
com/singjusprpr.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2008). The single justice has discretion over
whether to reserve ruling and report the case to the full SJC (if the parties have stipulated to a
2008] INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS, POLITICS, AND GOOD FAITH 629
enacting "An Act Improving the Public Schools of the Commonwealth"
(1985 Act).39 The single justice then suspended proceedings in Webby
once again.40
B. McDUFFY AND THE EDUCATION REFORM ACT OF 1993
1. The Litigation
Under the 1985 Act, new state money was distributed according to a
needs-based formula. 41 Equal Educational Opportunity grants were spe-
cifically designed to reduce disparities in spending between school dis-
tricts. 42 However, state aid for schools was distributed along with aid to
municipalities, with no particular money earmarked exclusively for
schools. 43 The entire process became a "political black box," with the
official funding formulas being overridden by the legislature each year.44
The plaintiffs filed a restated complaint in 1990.4 5
a. Plaintiff's strategy
The Council contended that the Commonwealth's school finance
system denied plaintiff children the opportunity to receive an adequate
education in violation of the Education Clause and the Equal Protection
factual record), transfer the case to the superior court for decision pursuant to Massachusetts
General Laws chapter 211, § 4A, or appoint a judge of the superior court to make findings of
fact and recommendations. Id. The process is largely not governed by formal rules. See id.
However, novel questions of law may be grounds for a single justice to reserve decision and
report a case to the full court. Id. In McDuffy, the single justice assigned to the case, Ruth
Abrams, received the parties' stipulations and then referred the case without decision to the
full SJC. McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 518. Therefore, there was no lower court that ever decided
the case. In Hancock, the single justice assigned to the case after Justice Abrams retired,
Justice Greaney, presided over the parties' attempts to reach a stipulated factual record, and
then, when agreement proved impossible, referred the case to Superior Court Judge Margot
Botsford for findings of fact and recommendations. Judge Botsford presided over a lengthy
trial and then submitted a report of her findings and conclusions to Justice Greaney. Justice
Greaney referred the case without decision to the full SJC. See Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ.,
822 N.E.2d 1134, 1145-46 (Mass. 2005).
39 McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 518. The existence of the Webby suit and its referral for trial
almost certainly impacted the legislature's decision to pass the Act. Telephone Interview with
Alan Jay Rom, Litigation Director, Legal Assistance Corporation of Central Massachusetts, in
Worcester, Mass. (Jan. 15, 2007) [hereinafter Rom Interview]; Shapiro Interview, supra note
30. Mr. Rom acted as co-counsel for the plaintiffs in both McDuffy and Hancock. Rom Inter-
view, supra.
40 McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 518.
41 Stipulation of Facts, supra note 27, at 20.
42 Id. at 28.
43 Shapiro Interview, supra note 30.
44 Shapiro Interview, supra note 30; Interview with Douglas Wilkins, Partner, Anderson
and Krieger, LLP, in Cambridge, Mass. (Jan. 17, 2007) [hereinafter Wilkins Interview]. Mr.
Wilkins was an Assistant Attorney General and chief counsel for the defendants in McDuffy.
Id.
45 McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 518.
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Clause of the Massachusetts constitution.46 They decided to frame what
came to be known as McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of
Education as an adequacy claim, rather than an equity claim or some sort
of hybrid. This was due to successful adequacy lawsuits in Kentucky,
New Jersey, Texas, and Montana in 1989 and 1990,47 and to new re-
search on the resources necessary for diverse student populations to
learn.48 It also saved them from difficult political decisions about the
exact meaning of "equity" in the context of school finance litigation.49
The Council decided to seek only a declaration that the Commonwealth
had the obligation to provide public school children in Massachusetts
with the opportunity to receive an adequate education and that it had
violated the constitution by failing to do so.50 Michael Weisman, lead
council for the plaintiffs, thought that the Supreme Judicial Court would
46 The text of the Education Clause of the Massachusetts constitution reads: "Wisdom
and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused generally among the body of the people, being
necessary for the preservation of their rights and liberties; and as these depend on spreading
the opportunities and advantages of education in the various parts of the country, and among
the different orders of the people, it shall be the duty of legislatures and magistrates, in all
future periods of this Commonwealth, to cherish the interests of literature and the science, and
all seminaries of them; especially the university at Cambridge, public schools and grammar
schools in the towns; to encourage private societies and public institutions, rewards and immu-
nities, for the promotion of agriculture, arts, sciences, commerce, trades, manufactures, and a
natural history of this country; to countenance and inculcate the principles of humanity and
general benevolence, public and private charity, industry and frugality, honesty and punctual-
ity in their dealings; sincerity, good humour, and all social affections, and generous sentiments
among the people." MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 5, § 2. The equal protection provisions are found
in Articles 1 and 10 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Article I provides: "All
people are born free and equal and have certain natural, essential and unalienable rights;
among which may be reckoned the fight of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties;
that of acquiring, possessing and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining
their safety and happiness. Equality of under the law shall not be denied or abridged because
of sex, race, color, creed or national origin." MAss. CONST. pt. 1, art. 1. Article 10 provides:
"Each individual of the society has a right to be protected by it in the enjoyment of his life,
liberty and property, according to standing laws." MASS. CONST. Pt. 1, art. 10.
47 Rom Interview, supra note 39. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d
186 (Ky. 1989); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989);
Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d
391 (Tex. 1989). While not all of the cases raised pure adequacy claims, all were based on a
state Education Clause.
48 Shapiro Interview, supra note 30. This suggests that plaintiffs' adequacy claim was a
way of getting at "vertical equity" or the idea that some students require more resources than
other students in order to achieve the same educational outcomes.
49 While most scholars conclude that equity is easier to understand and define than ade-
quacy, Alan Rom explained that during the earlier iterations of the suit, the Council debated
how to define equity: Equity with whom? With wealthy districts? With a state average? If
equality is mandated for all districts, would that prevent wealthy districts from hosting bake
sales or other informal measures to raise money for education? Rom Interview, supra note 39.
50 Id.; Interview with Michael Weisman, Partner, Weisman & McIntyre, in Boston,
Mass. (Feb. 2, 2007) [hereinafter Weisman Interview]. Mr. Weisman was lead counsel for the
plaintiffs in McDuffy and Hancock. Id. However, the plaintiffs' brief to the SJC strayed a bit
from this strategy. See infra discussion in Part I.B.Le.
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be more inclined to take a modest step rather than impose a dramatic
remedy during the first phase of litigation and had faith that once the
court declared a constitutional duty, the legislature would enact meaning-
ful reform. 5 1
The Council chose sixteen plaintiff districts that were well managed
but did not have sufficient funds to provide their students with an ade-
quate education. 52 They chose four "focus" districts (Brockton,
Leicester, Lowell, and Winchendon), which they thought exemplified the
problems in the plaintiff districts. 53 The focus districts were well man-
aged and geographically diverse, spanning both urban and rural commu-
nities. 54 The urban districts dealt with similar issues in terms of racial
and ethnic makeup, and all of the districts dealt with similar issues in
terms of percentage of poor, English language learning, and special edu-
cation students. 55 The Council also selected three "comparison" dis-
tricts, or districts that spent a lot of money on their school systems and
were very successful. 56 These districts (Brookline, Concord-Carlisle,
and Wellesley) also agreed to work with the plaintiffs in assembling
facts. 57
b. Defendant's strategy
The defendants' strategy in McDuffy changed when Scott Harsh-
barger was sworn in as Attorney General in January 1991.58 When Mr.
Harshbarger was campaigning for Attorney General in the fall of 1990,
he attended a candidates' forum hosted by the Greater Boston Civil
Rights Council and was asked whether, if elected, he would join the
plaintiffs in the McDuffy suit and appoint a Special Attorney General to
defend the Commonwealth. Harshbarger responded that he would. 59
51 Weisman Interview, supra note 50.
52 Rom Interview, supra note 39. The sixteen plaintiff districts in McDuffy were Brock-
ton, Belchertown, Berkley, Carver, Hanson, Holyoke, Lawrence, Leicester, Lowell, Lynn,




56 It may seem odd that the plaintiffs chose comparison districts in a pure adequacy case.
This paper categorizes McDuffy as an adequacy case because the claim was based on the
Education Clause of the Massachusetts constitution and the plaintiffs did not seek equal fund-
ing for education or equal district capacity to raise funds for education. Instead, they claimed a
substantive right to an adequate education, and provided evidence of the programs offered in
the comparison districts to highlight the poor quality of educational services provided in plain-
tiff districts. See McDuffy v. Sec'y of Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 519-20
(Mass. 1993). However, this introduces some notion of equity into the definition of an ade-
quate education; otherwise, the services provided in comparison districts would be irrelevant
to the inquiry.
57 Rom Interview, supra note 39.
58 Wilkins Interview, supra note 44.
59 Rom Interview, supra note 39. Mr. Rom drafted the question. Id.
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Once he took office, Harshbarger decided that he needed to defend the
Commonwealth and would not join the plaintiffs. 60 Around this time,
counsel at the Attorney General's office decided that the case was not
contestable on the facts and that they needed to focus their efforts solely
on the law. 61 Therefore, they agreed to a stipulation of facts and argued
that the constitutional Education Clause, which only required the legisla-
ture to "cherish" education, was hortatory and did not impose any judi-
cially enforceable duty on the legislature.62
c. Executive branch
The course of the litigation as a whole was profoundly impacted by
statements and reports made by the defendants Commissioner of Educa-
tion and Board of Education during 1990 and 1991. When the plaintiffs
filed their restated complaint in 1990, then-Commissioner of Education
and named defendant, Harold Raynolds, suggested that the court could
help schools by siding with the plaintiffs. 63 Raynolds resigned from his
position in 1991 in protest over the state's disinvestment in public educa-
tion.64 Once he was no longer a defendant in the litigation, he provided
an affidavit in support of the plaintiffs. 65 Raynolds stated, "The purpose
of public education is to provide every single child with an opportunity
for success in learning. In many of the communities in Massachusetts,
particularly less affluent communities such as the ones in which the
plaintiffs attend school, Massachusetts is failing-and failing more than
ever before-to achieve this goal." '66
The Board of Education agreed. In November, 1991, the Board re-
leased the Report of the Committee on Distressed School Systems and
School Reform. 67 The Report proclaimed a "state of emergency" in the
Commonwealth's public schools "due to grossly inadequate financial
60 Id.
61 The attorneys' perception that the system could not be defended was shaped by state-
ments of Department of Education staff members and members of the Board of Education
discussed below. In addition, the Attorney General's office had no experts to testify that edu-
cation was adequate in the plaintiff districts and did not think they could make an argument
that the state's support for education was sufficient. Wilkins Interview, supra note 44. For a
discussion of the posture of the Board of Education and Department of Education at the time,
see infra Part I.B.1.c.
62 Id.
63 Muriel Cohen, School Cuts Revive Suit to Redress Inequality; At Issue a Right to
Equal Opportunity, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 27, 1991, at 24.
64 Diego Ribadeneira, Mass. Education Chief Quits, BOSTON GLOBE, July 27, 1991, at 1.
65 See McDuffy v. Sec'y of Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 520 (Mass.
1993).
66 Id. at 520 n.ll. The court was clearly impacted by Raynolds' statement. See infra
Part I.B.I.f.
67 See McDuffy, 615 N.E. 2d at 553 n.9.
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support" 68 and admitted that "[c]ertain classrooms simply warehouse
children at this time, with no effective education being provided. '69 It
called for ending reliance on the local property tax and creating a "foun-
dation budget" to ensure adequate spending in school systems throughout
the state.70 The Report's author, then Board Chairman Martin Kaplan,
told the Boston Globe that the Commonwealth was on a "collision course
with disaster" because it did not have "adequate education funding across
the board."71 In addition, Robert Blumenthal, counsel for the defendant
Department of Education, called one of the plaintiff focus districts "a
school system in crisis," and a special committee appointed by the chair-
man of the state Board of Education described the same district as an
example of where "the commonwealth has not provided funding suffi-
cient to satisfy its obligations . . .for public education .*72
68 Id. at 552.
69 Id. Mr. Wilkins explained that the Attorney General's office knew that the Board was
planning to release the report but did not try to stop them. "The business of the Department of
Education is to try to make sure that education is maintained at the level it should be main-
tained .... I think it's wrong to have it governed by litigation .... So we didn't try to shut
them up ...." Wilkins Interview, supra note 44. Paul Reville, current Chairman of the
Massachusetts Board of Education and co-author of the report, explained that the Board mem-
bers knew about the existence of McDuffy and were aware that the report could influence the
litigation. Interview with Paul Reville, Professor, Harvard Graduate School of Education, in
Cambridge, Mass. (Jan. 30, 2007) [hereinafter Reville Interview]. However, they chose to
proceed because they believed they had a moral obligation to expose the problems in the
school financing system and felt "if that contributes to the outcome of the suit, so be it. We
don't mind." Id. Mr. Reville is the co-founder and Executive Director of the Massachusetts
Business Alliance for Education. He served on the Massachusetts State Board of Education
from 1991-1996 and was one of the coauthors of the Report of the Committee on Distressed
School Systems and School Reform. Mr. Reville also chaired the Massachusetts Education
Reform Review Commission from 1996-2003. He is currently the President of the Rennie
Center for Education Research and Policy and became Chairman of the State Board of Educa-
tion on August 28, 2007. See The Rennie Center for Education Research & Policy, http://
www.renniecenter.org/lstaff.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2008). Not all Board members agreed.
Piedad Robertson, Secretary of the Executive Office of Education and a member of Governor
Weld's cabinet, resigned from the Committee after consulting legal counsel because, as a
named defendant in McDuffy, she did not feel she should sign a report which stated that the
whole school financing system was in need of reform. See Jack Sullivan, Weld Aide Down-
plays School Report, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 25, 1991, at 13.
70 Sullivan, supra note 69. Counsel for the plaintiffs apparently thought the Board's
report was vital to their case as they began their brief to the Supreme Judicial Court by quoting
from it extensively. Brief for the Plaintiffs, supra note 29, at 2. The McDuffy court agreed.
After quoting the same passages, the court stated, "Arguably, this admission, by itself, suffices
to establish the constitutional violations." McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 552.
71 Anthony Flint, School Financing Attacked by Panel; Reform Urged in Mass., BOSTON
GLOBE, Nov. 24, 1991, at 1.
72 Patricia Nealon, In Brockton, a Case Study of Crisis; Students, Teachers Feel $5.5m in
Cuts, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 24, 1991, at 38.
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d. Stipulation of facts and conditions in the plaintiff
districts
McDuffy remains the only school finance case in the country to be
decided solely on a stipulated record. 73 The parties submitted a Stipula-
tion of Agreed Facts in October 1991 and a supplement with a six-vol-
ume appendix the next year.74 The stipulation stated that the focus
districts were typical of all plaintiff school districts.75 All four focus
districts had per-pupil expenditures 76 and equalized property valuation
below the state average. 77 The superintendents in all four districts stated
that their schools could not provide students with an adequate education
due to fiscal constraints.78
The stipulation also revealed the terrible conditions in the focus dis-
tricts. In Brockton, first- and second-graders had no math textbooks,
first- through third-graders had no writing textbooks, and seventh-grad-
ers had no social studies textbooks.79 In Leicester, teachers were dis-
couraged from attending trainings because the school could not afford to
pay substitutes, and the primary school teachers spent $500-$600 of their
own money on classroom supplies each year. 80 In Lowell, all adminis-
trators, including the superintendent, spent one day per week acting as a
substitute teacher. 81 In Winchendon, the middle school principal and as-
sistant principal were eliminated as a result of funding cuts.82 In addi-
tion, the district could not afford an elementary school science program,
elementary or middle school art programs or high school advanced place-
ment or honors courses.83
The parties also stipulated to a number of conclusions that impacted
the McDuffy court. First, a public school in one of the comparison dis-
tricts "[would] offer significantly greater educational opportunities than
the public schools in the communities in which the plaintiffs attend
school. ''84 Second, although there was disagreement among social sci-
ence experts over the impact of resources on educational quality, all
agreed that schools must have sufficient funds in order to reach educa-
73 Rom, supra note 14, at 125.
74 McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 518.
75 Stipulation of Facts, supra note 27, at 41.
76 For the 1989-1990 school year, per-pupil expenditure in Brockton was $4,191, in
Leicester $4,088, in Lowell $4,455, and in Winchendon $3,783. The statewide average was
$4,972. Id. at 44, 128, 149, 195.
77 Id. at 62, 143, 161, 210.
78 Id. at 48-49, 53, 129, 153-54, 195.
79 Id. at 53-55.
80 Id. at 131-32.
8t Id. at 153.
82 Id. at 196, 201.
83 Id. at 207-08.
84 Id. at 42.
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tional goals. 85 And third, the amount of money available to schools in
the comparison districts "[was] a significant contributing factor that af-
fects the quality of the education that these communities are able to pro-
vide their students, as compared to the plaintiffs' communities. ''8 6 In
December of 1992, a single justice reserved and reported the case with-
out decision to the full Supreme Judicial Court on the stipulated record. 87
e. Briefs of the parties
The plaintiffs argued that the Education Clause of the Massachu-
setts constitution required the Commonwealth to provide every public
school child with the opportunity to receive an adequate education and
that this duty could not be delegated to local governments. 88 They
sought a declaratory judgment that the Massachusetts constitution guar-
anteed students the right to an equal opportunity to receive an adequate
education. 89 Plaintiffs asked the court to provide guidelines for a consti-
tutional system and endorsed the seven guidelines adopted by the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court in Rose v. Council for Better Education.90 They
also asked the court to declare that each school district must have a guar-
anteed minimum level of funding, citing the Board of Education's and
Massachusetts Business Alliance for Education's (MBAE) support for a
foundation budget. 9'
The defendants stated the issue identically to the plaintiffs: whether,
under the Education Clause or equal protection provisions of the Massa-
chusetts constitution, the Commonwealth had a duty to provide the plain-
tiffs with equal access to an adequate education. 92 They argued that state
85 Id.
86 Id. at 43.
87 McDuffy v. Sec'y of Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 518 (Mass. 1993).
There was no lower court decision in McDuffy. For an explanation of single justice practice,
see supra note 38.
88 Brief for the Plaintiffs, supra note 29, at 85, 125-26. Plaintiffs also argued that the
Commonwealth had a duty under the equal protection provisions of the Massachusetts consti-
tution to provide children with equal access to an adequate education. Id. at 129-31. They
contended that education was a fundamental right under the constitution and that the Common-
wealth had no compelling government interest in depriving plaintiffs of an adequate education.
Id. at 103, 129. Local control was not compelling because only districts with large tax bases
could actually "control" education; property-poor districts could not tax themselves into being
able to provide an adequate education. Id. at 140, 143. In the alternative, plaintiffs argued that
the Massachusetts school financing system was not rationally related to any legitimate state
interest. Id. at 127-53. The court decided the case solely on the Education Clause and did not
reach the equal protection issue. McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 522 n.15.
89 Brief for the Plaintiffs, supra note 29, at 4.
90 Id. at 157 (quoting Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky.
1989)).
91 Id. at 158-59. For an explanation of the MBAE's role, see infra Part I.B.2.b.
92 Brief for the Defendants, supra note 28, at 1; Brief for the Plaintiffs, supra note 29, at
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aid had an equalizing effect that reduced the effects of unequal district
income and property wealth to a point where per-pupil expenditures were
no longer substantially unequal. 93 In addition, even in the lowest spend-
ing districts, spending was high by historic measures. Massachusetts
per-pupil expenditures ranked seventh or eighth highest in the nation. 94
Defendants argued that the constitution left school finance decisions
to the legislature and the democratic process.95 First, the Education
Clause was aspirational, not mandatory, and did not create judicially en-
forceable rights.96 The plain language, structure, history, and original
understanding of the clause all supported this interpretation. 97 Next, if
the Education Clause did impose some duty on the legislature, the legis-
lature had acted to "cherish" education by providing equalizing state
funding and promoting local control.98 If the constitution required the
Commonwealth to provide plaintiffs with an adequate education, the
plaintiffs had not shown that the duty had been violated.99 Lastly, school
finance litigation in Texas and New Jersey cautioned against a constitu-
tional interpretation that would require massive, redistributive state
spending in the face of popular opposition. 100
f. At the Supreme Judicial Court
The Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) heard oral argument in February
1993 and issued its decision on June 15 of that year.' 10 The court de-
cided the case solely on the Education Clause, holding that it imposed "a
93 Brief for the Defendants, supra note 28, at 19-23. Specifically, defendants used the
Gini Coefficient to show that the departure from perfect equality in per-pupil expenditure was
only ten percent. Id. at 21.
94 Id. at 27-31. However, when only state funding was considered, Massachusetts
ranked forty-third. Id. at 31.
95 Id. at 60.
96 Id. at 60, 65.
97 Id. at 60-87. The defendants argued that the word "cherish" meant merely to hold
dear. Id. at 61-62. First, the framers and first legislatures of the Commonwealth could not
have thought that "cherish" meant to support or provide for education, because no state fund-
ing was provided until 1827. Id. at 62-63. Second, the Education Clause was placed in the
structural section of the constitution, rather than the section that protected individual rights.
Id. at 63-64. Third, the legislature's "duty" in the Education Clause was not only to "cherish"
the public schools, "but also to 'encourage' private and public efforts in [the] promotion of
agriculture, arts, sciences, etc." and to "countenance and inculcate the principles of humanity
and general benevolence." Id. at 64. These goals could not be judicially enforceable. Id.
98 Id. at 96-100, 102-06. The legislature provided $30 million in emergency school
funding during the 1991-1992 school year. Money was distributed to reduce classroom over-
crowding and purchase new text books. One-hundred eighty-six million dollars in emergency
funding was also budgeted for Fiscal Year (FY) 1993. Id. at 102-03.
99 Id. at 111-17. The defendants conceded that a minimal level of education could be
required, but they argued that plaintiffs had not alleged that such a standard had been violated.
Id. at 116 n.50.
100 Id. at 132-37.
101 McDuffy v. Sec'y of Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993).
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constitutional duty on the Commonwealth to ensure the education of its
children in the public schools." 02
The bulk of the court's opinion consists of a detailed explanation of
the history of public education in Massachusetts since 1647 and a rigor-
ous analysis of the language and original understanding of the Education
Clause.' 0 3 The Education Clause, in relevant part, imposes a duty on
legislatures and magistrates "to cherish ... public schools and grammar
schools in the towns."' 1 4 Chief Justice Paul Liacos, through the use of
eighteenth century dictionaries, showed that when the Massachusetts
constitution was adopted, "a duty to cherish" meant an obligation to sup-
port and nurture. 0 5 After summarizing the early writings of John Ad-
ams, principal author of the Massachusetts constitution, and the views
and actions of early Massachusetts legislatures, the court concluded that
"the Commonwealth has a duty to provide an education for all its chil-
dren, rich and poor, in every city and town of the Commonwealth at the
public school level."' 0 6 The court further explained that this duty lay
squarely on the executive and legislative branches. While the Common-
wealth could delegate some implementation of education policy to local
governments, it could not "abdicate the obligation imposed on magis-
trates and Legislatures placed on them by the Constitution."10 7
After reviewing the "bleak portrait of the plaintiffs' schools ...
painted in large part by the defendant's own statements," the court con-
cluded that the Commonwealth was failing to fulfill its constitutional ob-
ligation to educate all children. 0 8 To define the nature of the
Commonwealth's duty, the court adopted the seven guidelines set out by
the Kentucky Supreme Court in Rose v. Council for Better Education.10 9
102 Id. at 519.
103 See id. at 523-45.
104 Id. at 523 (quoting MASS. CONST. pt. II, ch. 5, § 2).
105 Id. at 525-26.
106 Id. at 548.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 553-54. In coming to its conclusion, the court described "statement after state-
ment recounting the Commonwealth's failure to educate the children in the plaintiffs' school
and those they typify," and was particularly affected by the 1991 Report of the Committee on
Distressed School Systems and School Reform. Id. at 552.
109 See id. at 554 ("An educated child must posses 'at least the seven following capabili-
ties: (i) sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable students to function in a
complex and rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and
political systems to enable students to make informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of
governmental processes to enable the student to understand the issues that affect his or her
community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her
mental and physical wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to
appreciate his or her cultural and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation for
advanced training in either academics or vocational fields so as to enable each child to choose
and pursue life work intelligently; and (vii) sufficient level of academic or vocational skills to
enable public school students to compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding
638 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 17:621
The court stressed that the ultimate responsibility for defining the spe-
cific and appropriate means of providing the constitutionally required ed-
ucation was properly left to the legislative and executive branches."l 0 It
expressed faith that the Commonwealth would fulfill its duty and remedy
the constitutional violations. 1  The court concluded by permitting a sin-
gle justice to retain jurisdiction to "determine whether, within a reasona-
ble time, appropriate legislative action has been taken."' 12
2. The Legislation
The education reform movement in Massachusetts cannot be ex-
plained solely in terms of the McDuffy litigation. Education reform had
political momentum of its own that can only be understood by examining
the interrelated roles of the factual situation in the school districts be-
tween 1990 and 1993, the Massachusetts Business Alliance for Educa-
tion (MBAE), and the political leadership of state senator Thomas
Birmingham, state representative Mark Roosevelt, and Governor Wil-
liam Weld.
a. Facts on the ground
During the mid-1980s, the Massachusetts economy was strong, and
state aid to public schools helped soften the blow of Proposition 2 1h.113
However, in 1988, Massachusetts entered a period of economic down-
turn that profoundly impacted state aid to public schools." 14 In FY 1987,
39.04% of school budgets came from state aid, but by FY 1990, that
number was down to 35.47%.115 In FY 1990, the state attempted to cut
local aid by $210 million; in FY 1992 local aid was successfully reduced
by $328.6 million, or 20.6%. 116 The impact on schools did not go unno-
ticed. School budgets were "cut to the bone" as a result of the cuts in
state aid.'1 7 Newspaper stories highlighted students in Ware, who, after
states, in academics or in the job market.'" (quoting Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc.,
790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989)).
11o See id. at 554-55.
111 See id. at 554. For a discussion of why the court had such faith in the legislature, see
supra Part I.B.3.b.
112 Id. at 556. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor concurred in part and dissented in part,
finding that although the Commonwealth did have an enforceable constitutional duty to pro-
vide education for all of its children, the plaintiffs had not shown that the duty had been
violated. See id. at 556-57 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
113 Anthony Flint, Saving a System Mired in Mediocrity, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 15, 1991,
at A21.
114 Id.; see also Diego Ribadeneira, School Board Hears of Devastation by Cuts, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 27, 1991, at 1.
115 Stipulation of Facts, supra note 27, at 37.
116 Id. at 32-33. In FY 1990 the $210 million cut was successfully challenged by a
lawsuit, but the funding was not distributed to cities until FY 1991. Id.
117 Wilkins Interview, supra note 44.
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their elementary school was condemned, had to eat lunch in the basement
of the district court, only feet away from shackled prisoners. 18 In Hol-
yoke, one special education class had eighty students."19
However, there was never any mass social movement around school
funding.120 Paul Reville, current Chairman of the Massachusetts Board
of Education, explained that, in general, parents were fairly happy with
their own children's schools, therefore pressure for education reform
came more from the political and governmental elite. '21 Senator Thomas
Birmingham, who co-chaired the Senate Education Committee during
this era, confirmed that education reform was mostly run by institutional
players and interest groups.' 22
b. Jack Rennie and the Massachusetts Business Alliance for
Education
One of the most important institutional players was the Massachu-
setts Business Alliance for Education (MBAE). The MBAE was formed
in 1988 by Jack Rennie, a well respected businessman and CEO, and
Paul Reville, an education advocate, for the purpose of bringing about a
massive reinvention of the public school system in Massachusetts.123
Conceiving of the project as "reform done with the [education] field, not
to the field,"' 124 the MBAE immediately embarked on meetings with
stakeholder groups to find out what was needed to reform and reshape
public education. 125 Out of these conversations emerged the 1991 report
118 See Flint, supra note 113.
119 Ribadeneira, supra note 114, at 1.
120 See Interview with Thomas Birmingham, Former Senator, Massachusetts State Legis-
lature, in Boston, Mass. (Jan. 25, 2007 and Feb. 1, 2007) [hereinafter Birmingham Interview].
Former Senator Birmingham was the chairman of the Senate Education committee, chairman
of the Senate Ways and Means Committee, and then Senate President between 1991 and
2002. Id. He was one of the primary authors of the Education Reform Act of 1993 and left the
legislature to run for Governor of Massachusetts in 2002. Id.
121 Reville Interview, supra note 69.
122 Birmingham Interview, supra note 120.
123 Reville Interview, supra note 69. Mr. Rennie was the Chairman and CEO of Pacer
Systems Inc. and Mr. Reville, at that time, ran a local education fund in Worcester. Id. The
two sat on the Commonwealth's School Business Partnership Advisory Group. Id. Mr.
Reville explained that as business leaders, Mr. Rennie and others spent increasing time in
public schools through partnership activities; they were shocked by the lack of clear goals,
accountability, human resource development, and power for principles to run their own
schools. Id. These business leaders came to realize that schools were not producing kids who
were ready to take the kinds of jobs they had to offer. Id.
124 Id.
125 Everyone interviewed for this paper who discussed the role of the MBAE stressed
how inclusive of all voices the organization, and Jack Rennie in particular, was. Interview
with Joanne Blum, Governmental Services Director, Massachusetts Teachers Association, in
Boston, Mass. (Jan. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Blum Interview]; Shapiro Interview, supra note 30.
The list of stakeholders consulted includes state legislators, both state teachers unions, superin-
tendents, members of the State Board of Education, local school committee members, staff
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"Every Child a Winner! A Proposal for a Legislative Action Plan for
Systemic Reform of Massachusetts' Public Primary and Secondary Edu-
cation System."' 2 6 The basic premise of the report was high standards
and accountability for all students in exchange for a progressive refinanc-
ing of public schools. 12 7 The MBAE recommended that the Common-
wealth create outcome-oriented goals for education and performance
measurements to attach rewards and penalties to school performance.' 28
In exchange, the state would calculate a foundation budget for each
school district. 129 The budget, created by school superintendents and
written by economist and MBAE consultant Dr. Edward Moscovitch,
was based on specific factors and assumptions and took into account the
increased costs of educating special education, bilingual, and low income
students. 130
The report was incredibly well-received by decisionmakers on Bea-
con Hill and across the Commonwealth. Governor Weld, a Republican,
was more comfortable dealing with business groups than he was with the
education "establishment"-teachers unions, superintendents, and school
committees. 131 Jack Rennie had political connections to the Weld ad-
ministration, and Paul Reville was close to James Harrington, Weld's
education advisor during his transition in early 1991.132 Education was
at the top of the political agenda, and both Governor Weld and the state
house and senate leadership wanted some type of reform. 133 The MBAE
proposals were perfectly situated to become the ideas that catalyzed the
movement.
from the Department of Education, professors, the Commissioner of Education, Governor
Weld and his advisors, the Boston Chamber of Commerce, the Massachusetts Business Round-
table, the Small Business Association of New England, the University of Massachusetts, and
many others. See EVERY CHILD A WINNER!, supra note 37, at Appendix A-5 to 9.
126 See generally EVERY CHILD A WINNER!, supra note 37 (proposing how to reform the
failing education system).
127 Reville Interview, supra note 69.
128 See EVERY CHILD A WINNER!, supra note 37, at 27-28.
129 See id. at 36-39.
130 Id. at 36. The budget included extra teachers and aids to be provided for special
education students and smaller class sizes to be provided for bilingual students. Id. at Appen-
dix D-4 to 5. For low income students there was money to reduce class sizes and create half
day preschool, full day kindergarten, and parent outreach programs for children ages one to
three. Id. at Appendix D-16 to 17. Extra hours of schooling during the academic year and a
twelve-week summer program were also included. Id. at 36, Appendix D-17. This extra state
funding made a huge difference in the foundation budgets of districts with high percentages of
low income students. Id. at Appendix D-19 to 20. In the eleven districts with low income
enrollment greater than 40%, Boston was the only district that spent within $2,000 per pupil of
its foundation budget. See id. at Appendix D-20.
131 Shapiro Interview, supra note 30.
132 Reville Interview, supra note 69.
133 See Flint, supra note 113.
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c. The Legislature and Governor Weld
The story of education reform in the Massachusetts state house is
largely one of the heroic efforts of Representative Mark Roosevelt and
Senator Thomas Birmingham. Newly appointed to chair the House-Sen-
ate Joint Education Committee, both men were sincerely committed to
education reform and to public education. 34 Governor Weld came on
board early as well. 135
Joint meetings between Representative Roosevelt, Senator Birming-
ham, Governor Weld, and the MBAE began in the summer of 1991, with
the idea that all three branches would work together to submit a joint
education reform bill. 136 All parties agreed on the basic concept of a
massive infusion of new state money in the form of a foundation budget
in exchange for high standards and accountability from all students,
teachers, and schools. 37 However, talks broke down during the summer
of 1992, mostly over funding, and each branch eventually submitted its
own bill. 138 Edward Moscovitch continued to work with Representative
Roosevelt, and his foundation budget made it into the final legislation
almost whole cloth.' 39
As the bills made their way through the state house, there was an
absence of real, vehement, institutional opposition to education reform.
Some legislators were concerned about what the foundation budget
would cost. 140 Others were skeptical that it would constitute "real" re-
134 Blum Interview, supra note 125 (Ms. Blum called Senator Birmingham the legislator
with the deepest understanding of how education can change lives); Shapiro Interview, supra
note 30. Birmingham credits his own upbringing for his understanding of how education can
change lives. Birmingham Interview, supra note 120. He grew up in a working class neigh-
borhood with parents who did not attend college but who made education a top priority for
their children. Id. Senator Birmingham attended Harvard University, won a Rhodes Scholar-
ship, and then graduated from Harvard Law School. Id.
135 See Anthony Flint & Muriel Cohen, Education Report Retreats on Some Cuts; But
Adviser Seconds Weld on Abolishing Regents Panel, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 3, 1991, at 19.
Governor Weld's education advisor met with MBAE representatives, reviewed a draft copy of
Every Child a Winner! A Proposal for a Legislative Action Plan for Systemic Reform of Mas-
sachusetts' Public Primary and Secondary Education System, and adopted a number of the
MBAE proposals in his transition report, including the foundation budget. Reville Interview,
supra note 69.
136 Diego Ribadeneira, Property Tax Funding of Schools Questioned, BOSTON GLOBE,
March 4, 1992, at 23; Reville Interview, supra note 69.
137 Muriel Cohen, School Panel Ok's $8m Cut, 269 Layoffs; Weld Seeks to Balance
State's Disparities, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 16, 1992, at 1; Birmingham Interview, supra note
120.
138 Both Representative Roosevelt and Senator Birmingham believed that funding educa-
tion reform would require new taxes, while Governor Weld was adamantly opposed to any tax
increase. Muriel Cohen, School Bill Faces Limits Equity, Raising Money May Be Sticking
Points, BOSTON GLOBE, March 9, 1992, at 15; Birmingham Interview, supra note 120.
139 Reville Interview, supra note 69.
140 Id.
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form, given the problems with the 1978 and 1985 legislation. 141 How-
ever, no organizations were opposed to the general proposition of
increased state funding in exchange for high standards. 142 Wealthy
school districts did not lobby against the reform bill. 143 There was no
furor from anti-tax coalitions or other small government groups. 144 Out
of all the organizations it met with, the MBAE had the most difficult
time getting the teachers unions, both of whom were members of the
Council, on board.145 Senator Birmingham pointed out that the lack of
opposition might have been due to the fact that most people, including
most legislators, did not understand how redistributive the foundation
budget would be. 146 The formula was a complicated calculation deter-
mined by eighteen different factors, and very few people besides its au-
thors knew precisely how it worked. 147 He also acknowledged that while
State House support for the legislation was very broad, "for some legisla-
tors, I think it was probably as deep as the veneer of the table."148
That is not to say that the bill "roll[ed] in on wheels of inevitabil-
ity."1 49 It took two years and hundreds of hours of work from the time
meetings with Representative Roosevelt, Senator Birmingham, and Gov-
ernor Weld first began until final passage of the bill. Funding for the
ERA was a huge fight that caused multiple breakdowns in negotiations.
Even in the days leading up to final passage in June of 1993 there was a
fair amount of politicking. 150 However, final passage was secured on
141 Birmingham Interview, supra note 120.
142 See Id.; Blum Interview, supra note 125; Reville Interview, supra note 69. Some
business groups, including the Hi-Tech Council, had other priorities for education, but because
they respected Jack Rennie, they largely stayed out of the debate. Reville Interview, supra
note 69. The one exception was Bill Edgerly, the CEO of State Street Bank and former board
member of the conservative Pioneer Institute. Id. He formed a group called CEOs for Funda-
mental Change and pushed for school choice. Id. Although his proposals did not make it into
the Education Reform Act, they were the basis for Governor Weld's eighteen reform bills
submitted after he signed the Act. Id.
143 Birmingham Interview, supra note 120; Shapiro Interview, supra note 30. In fact, as
noted above, Brookline, Concord-Carlisle, and Wellesley were so supportive of the plaintiffs'
case that they participated as comparison districts in McDuffy.
144 Birmingham Interview, supra note 120.
145 Reville Interview, supra note 69.
146 Birmingham Interview, supra note 120.
147 Id.
148 Id. This superficiality of the support became clear when attempts were made to cut
funding while the Act was being implemented. See infra Part I.C.
149 Birmingham Interview, supra note 120.
15o The house passed the Education Reform Bill by a large margin on June 2, 1993, and
the senate followed suit the next day. See Peter J. Howe, Mass. Senate OK's School Bill Amid
Criticisms, BOSTON GLOBE, June 4, 1993, at I [hereinafter Howe, Senate OK's School Bill].
That day, a Weld insider leaked a memorandum written by Special Assistant Steven Wilson,
who had previously worked at the conservative Pioneer Institute. Id. The memo reluctantly
urged Weld to sign the bill but called the reforms "hollow": "We are buying very little real
reform. We are simply pumping money into the failed structure with a little tinkering." Id.
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June 8, 1993, and Governor Weld signed the Education Reform Act of
1993 (ERA) on June 18, three days after the McDuffy decision. 151
The ERA dramatically changed the system of public education in
the Commonwealth. 152 The foundation of the Act was a massive in-
crease in state funding for education to be distributed in a very progres-
sive manner, in exchange for increased accountability from students,
teachers, and administrators for educational outcomes.15 3 The Act has a
number of key provisions. First, it established a foundation budget for
each school district, designed to be the minimum level of per-pupil
spending for each district. 154 The foundation budget is calculated by
eighteen factors ranging from teacher salaries to maintenance ex-
penses. 155 A minimum local contribution, based on equalized property
valuation, is also required.' 56 The state makes up the difference between
a school district's local contribution and its foundation budget through
Chapter 70 aid. 157 The budget formula includes weights to account for
the higher cost of educating special education students, English language
learners, and low income students. 158
Second, the ERA set up a sophisticated assessment and accountabil-
ity system. It directed the Board of Education and the Commissioner of
Education to establish statewide educational standards for all elementary
and secondary school students and "curriculum frameworks" for attain-
ing those standards in English, math, science and technology, history and
social science, foreign languages, and the arts. 159 It instructed the board
to create a system to evaluate the performance of districts and schools
based on statewide academic standards.160 Schools that fail to improve
House Republicans then tried to block final passage of the bill by releasing what they called
the "real costs" of the legislation, based on figures provided by defendant and Weld cabinet
member, Piedad Robertson. Frank Phillips & Scott Lehigh, School Bill Leader Urges Weld to
Quit 'Sabotage' Efforts, BOSTON GLOBE, June 8, 1993, at 22. Governor Weld indicated that he
would probably sign the bill but return to the legislature with follow up legislation to deal with
issues with which he was not satisfied, including provisions .on school choice and charter
schools. Peter J. Howe, Weld Leans Toward Signing Bill for Education Reform, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 9, 1993, at 26 [Howe, Signing Bill].
151 Howe, supra note 8, at 1.
152 The Education Reform Act of 1993 is codified at 1993 Mass. Legis. Serv. Ch. 71
(West). Most of the Act's changes are codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 69, § I-IL, ch. 70,
and ch. 71 (2007).
153 Birmingham Interview, supra note 120; Reville Interview, supra note 69.
154 See Hancock ex rel. Hancock v. Driscoll (Botsford Report), No. 02-2978, 2004 WL
877984, at *5 (Mass. Super. Apr. 26, 2004) (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 70, § 2).
155 See id. (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 70, § 2).
156 See id. (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 70, § 2).
157 Id. (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 70, § 6).
158 Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1142 (Mass. 2005) (citing MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 70 §§ 2 et seq.).
159 Botsford Report, 2004 WL 877984, at *6.
160 Id.
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student academic performance can be deemed "underperforming" or
"chronically underperforming" and can be taken over by the state. 61
The Act also created a rigorous new teacher qualification program. 162
Lastly, it removed principals from collective bargaining agreements and
officially abolished teacher tenure. 163
3. The Influence of the Court on the Legislative Outcome and
Vice Versa
a. The impact of McDuffy on the Education Reform Act
While the ERA was not a response to the McDuffy decision, as the
bill was passed one week before the court issued its decision, the litiga-
tion played an important role in the development of the Act and the gen-
eral politics concerning education reform. Legislators were mindful of
McDuffy as they debated education reform. 164 They were particularly
aware that, in order to address the plaintiff's case, any reform would
need to confront the rampant inequalities in the financing system. 65
Both the MBAE and Senator Birmingham used the existence of the law-
suit to push state legislators to act. 166 Lead counsel for defendants,
Douglas Wilkins, met with legislators and staffers to keep them apprised
of case developments. 167 Senator Birmingham also met with plaintiffs'
counsel while the case was proceeding. He explained that he supported
the plaintiffs' case and hoped the SJC would declare that an equitable,
adequate education was constitutionally required in Massachusetts,
thinking "it would make a firmer basis going forward for support for
education if it was a constitutional requirement."1 68
Facts developed by the plaintiffs for the court case helped to create
the sense that the school finance system was broken and needed fixing.
This almost certainly influenced how legislators thought about the issue.
Newspaper articles commonly used stipulated facts to highlight the dis-
161 Id.
162 Id. at *7.
163 Id. Thomas Payzant, the Superintendent of the Boston Public Schools from 1995 until
2006, explained that while taking school principles out of collective bargaining had a major
impact on day to day school operations, officially abolishing teacher tenure did not, because
the new "just cause" system was virtually indistinguishable from the old. Interview with
Thomas Payzant, Senior Lecturer, Harvard Graduate School of Education, in Cambridge,
Mass. (Mar. 21, 2007).
164 Birmingham Interview, supra note 120; Reville Interview, supra note 69.
165 Reville Interview, supra note 69.
166 Id.; Birmingham Interview, supra note 120.
167 Wilkins Interview, supra note 44.
168 Birmingham Interview, supra note 120. For a discussion of how McDuffy influenced
the implementation of the Education Reform Act, see infra Part I.C.
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parities between districts. 169 While the Council as an entity did not
lobby, individual member groups did, and when they spoke to legislators
and testified at hearings, they used facts developed in the litigation to
prove their points. 170 The Boston Globe consistently connected the
pending education reform bills to the lawsuit; after the decision came
down, the Globe published a set of articles on whether the Act would
fulfill the court's constitutional mandate. 17 When McDuffy was referred
to the full SJC by the single justice, state officials expressed hope that the
case would prompt Governor Weld and the Legislature to pass a reform
bill before they were forced to do so by the court. Attorney General
Harshbarger advised that "the fastest and least adversarial way to achieve
meaningful reform in our education system is for the governor and
[l]egislature to agree on a legislative package."' 172
b. The impact of the Education Reform Act on McDuffy
In most school finance cases, this inquiry is irrelevant because legis-
lation is passed in order to remedy a constitutional violation already de-
clared by the court. However, in McDuffy, the reform legislation was
passed one week before the court issued its decision, and it is therefore
useful to consider what, if any, impact the legislation had on the court's
decision. State legislators had their own theories at the time. A number
commented that they were struck by the timing of McDuffy and specu-
lated whether the SJC was trying to push Governor Weld to sign the bill,
which he did three days later, or "to ensure the court acted in time to look
like it had forced the bill's enactment without offending legislators by
setting them up to pass the bill under threat."' 173
When the case was briefed, the court knew that education reform
legislation was in the works. Newspaper articles about the legislation
were difficult to avoid. The plaintiffs stated in their brief that both the
MBAE and Governor Weld had proposed a foundation budget
formula. 174 Most importantly, Justice John Greaney, a member of the
169 See, e.g., Diego Ribadeneira, Disparities Between Rich, Poor Systems Often Glaring,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 25, 1993, at 16 (using facts from the Stipulation of Facts in McDuffy to
showcase disparities between Wellesley and Winchendon).
170 Shapiro Interview, supra note 30.
171 See, e.g., Jordana Hart, School Reform Bill Resembles SJC Guide, BOSTON GLOBE,
June 17, 1993, at 47; Peter J. Howe, MTA Deems School Overhaul Bill Inadequate, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 17, 1993, at 47; Editorial, From Courthouse to Schoolhouse, BOSTON GLOBE,
June 18, 1993, at 18.
172 Lauren Robinson, SJC Takes School Case; Lawsuit Challenges Property-Tax Fund-
ing, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 15, 1992, at 25.
173 Peter J. Howe, School Bill May Answer SJC Demands; Speed of Aid Hikes Seen as an
Issue, BOSTON GLOBE, June 16, 1993, at 19.
174 Brief for the Plaintiffs, supra note 29, at 159. In its amicus brief to the court, the
MBAE also stressed that reform legislation was imminent. See also Brief of Amici Curiae
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McDuffy court, confirmed the justices' knowledge of the impending leg-
islation. In his Hancock dissent, Greaney explained that "McDuffy was
released with the court's knowledge that the Legislature was poised to
enact the Education Reform Act of 1993 . . . the three events[-the
McDuffy decision and the Act's passage and signing-]comprised in fact
and law a joint enterprise on the part of the three branches of govern-
ment." 75 He made a similar point during the Hancock oral argument,
explaining that the lack of a specific remedy in McDuffy had to be con-
sidered in light of the court's knowledge, at the time the decision was
written, that passage of the ERA was imminent. 76 Therefore, it seems
certain that the impending passage of the ERA influenced how the court
wrote the McDuffy decision and why it expressed such confidence that
the legislature would step in with an appropriate remedy.
C. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EDUCATION REFORM ACT AND THE
ROAD TO HANCOCK
Getting the ERA implemented was difficult. The bill was signed
into law with no dedicated pool of money to fund the massive increases
in state aid that were scheduled to phase in over seven years, and Gover-
nor Weld vowed to veto any tax increase that the legislature tried in
order to fund the bill. 177 That all school districts reached their founda-
tion budgets by the year 2000 was largely the result of Senator Birming-
ham's work in the state house, a burgeoning economy that made fully-
funding the bill possible without increasing taxes, and McDuffy.178 Sen-
Massachusetts Business Alliance for Education, et al. at 16 n.4, Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ.,
822 N.E.2d 1134 (Mass. 2005) (No. SJC-09267).
175 Hancock, 822 N.E.2d at 1165 (Greaney, J., dissenting).
176 Audio tape of Hancock Oral Argument, supra note 19. Some scholars fail to recog-
nize this dynamic or acknowledge that the McDuffy decision was handed down after the legis-
lature had already passed the ERA, and therefore characterize the decision as weak on remedy.
See, e.g., George D. Brown, Binding Advisory Opinions: A Federal Court's Perspective on the
State School Finance Decisions, 35 B.C. L. REv. 543, 544 (1994) ("When it comes to the
question of remedy, however, the McDuffy court's boldness evaporates. A high degree of
deference to the legislature is the dominant theme."); Michael Heise, Preliminary Thoughts on
the Virtues of Passive Dialogue, 34 AKRON L. REv. 73, 103-04 (2000) (commenting that the
tone of the remedy section of McDuffy "reveal[ed] marked institutional hesitance" and essen-
tially left to the legislature the task of recreating the school finance system).
177 Howe, supra note 8.
178 Paul Reville, Norma Shapiro, Joanne Blum, and Deirdre Roney all credit Senator Bir-
mingham with ensuring that the act was fully funded. Blum Interview, supra note 125; Reville
Interview, supra note 69; Interview with Deirdre Roney, Assistant Attorney General, in Bos-
ton, Mass. (Jan. 24, 2007) [hereinafter Roney Interview]; Shapiro Interview, supra note 30.
Ms. Roney was chief counsel for the defendants in Hancock. Roney Interview, supra. By
1994, Birmingham was the Chair of the Senate Ways and Means Committee and officially in
charge of the senate budget. See Profile of Thomas F. Birmingham, Edwards Angell Palmer &
Dodge, http://www.eapdlaw.com/professionals/detail.aspxattorney=411 (last visited Mar. 28,
2008).
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ator Birmingham used the McDuffy decision to prod legislators to fund
the Act even when political will was lacking. 179 For example, in 1995,
the house budget came out of the Ways and Means Committee with $46
million cut from what had been promised for education reform. 18 0 Spec-
ulation abounded that legislative support for the ERA was unraveling and
the legislature would not keep its promise to schools.' 8 ' The McDuffy
plaintiffs immediately filed for additional relief.182 However, after the
senate budget fully funded the Act and the house agreed to the senate
funding, the plaintiffs dropped their claim. 183 Similar funding issues
arose a number of other times.18 4
Notwithstanding these setbacks, education funding took precedence
over all other social programs between 1993 and 2000.185 By 2000,
every school district in Massachusetts was spending at or above its foun-
dation budget. 18 6 State aid to public schools increased from $1.6 billion
in 1993 to $4 billion in 2002.187 Between 1993 and 2003, the Common-
wealth spent a total of $30.8 billion in state aid to public schools. 18 8
State aid also reduced or reversed spending gaps between districts. In
1993, the top 25% of districts by property wealth spent 38% more per
pupil than the lowest 25%; in 2003, the difference was reduced to
19%.189 In terms of numbers of students eligible for free or reduced-
price lunch, the 25% of districts with the most students in poverty spent
4% less than the 25% of districts with the least numbers of poor students
in 1993; in 2002, the numbers reversed, with the highest poverty districts
spending $8,504, or 5% more than the lowest poverty districts at
$8,144.190 In addition, the curriculum frameworks were adopted in
179 Birmingham Interview, supra note 120.
180 Peter J. Howe, Planned School Aid Hike Is Cut; House Chairman Says $46m Must
Go, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 4, 1995, at 23.
181 Birmingham Interview, supra note 120; see also Howe, supra note 180.
182 Shapiro Interview, supra note 30; Weisman Interview, supra note 50; see also Jordana
Hart, Education Funding Suit Reopened, BOSTON GLOBE, May 11, 1995, at 64.
183 See Birmingham Interview, supra note 120; Weisman Interview, supra note 50.
184 In 1999, the house budget cut $90 million from what had been promised for education
reform, and the budget was held up for six months because Senator Birmingham refused to
pass it without fully funding the Act. See Doreen ludica Vigue, Education Reform Funds May
Be Cut; Schools Losing State House Allies, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 18, 1999, at Al. Later that
year then-Governor Cellucci vetoed $94 million of school aid, and the veto was unanimously
overridden by the house and senate. See Michael Crowley, Lawmakers Override Veto of
School Aid; $94m Fund Restored as Cellucci Suffers Setbacks in Final Hours, BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 18, 1999, at Al.
185 Birmingham Interview, supra note 120.
186 Hancock ex rel. Hancock v. Driscoll (Botsford Report), No. 02-2978, 2004 WL
877984, at *8 (Mass. Super. Apr. 26, 2004).
187 Id.
188 See id.
189 Id. at *14.
190 Id. at *14.
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1996,'91 and the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System
(MCAS) test 192 and school and district accountability systems were ad-
ministered for the first time in 1998.193
Despite the fact that the foundation budgets were about to be fully
funded and the accountability system implemented, plaintiffs filed for
additional relief in December of 1999.194 This was not a surprise. Many
Council groups thought from the beginning that the foundation budget
would not be sufficient. Two days before the ERA was signed by Gover-
nor Weld, the Massachusetts Teachers Association (MTA) argued that
the foundation budget was inadequate. 195 The union introduced a propo-
sal which would have set the annual foundation budget at an average of
$6,000 per student, rather than the $5,500 included in the Act.196 Norma
Shapiro explained that because the formula had not been adjusted for
inflation and for various other reasons, the foundation budget was about
$1,000 per student too low from the start. 197 However, Council members
recognized that, for political reasons, they needed to allow the foundation
budget to be implemented before filing for additional relief. 198
191 See id. at *8; Birmingham Interview, supra note 120.
192 Botsford Report, 2004 WL 877984, at *9. The test is currently given in English/
language arts (ELA), math, and science/technology classes. All high school students must
achieve a score of "Needs Improvement" or better on the tenth grade ELA and mathematics
tests in order to receive a diploma. Id.
193 Id. at *9-13. The elaborate system provides that schools with the lowest performance
ratings can be referred to the Department of Education (the Department) for review to deter-
mine whether they are "underperforming." Id. at *11. An "underperforming" determination
leads to technical assistance from the Department and eventually to corrective action. Id. at
*12. On the other hand, schools that drastically improve student performance can be named
"compass" schools to help disseminate best practices. Id. at *11. Due to a lack of resources,
the Department actually reviews very few schools each year. Id. at *11-12. In 2001, the
Department identified between 100 and 200 schools as candidates for underperforming status
because of very low MCAS performance but reviewed only twelve. Id.
194 See Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1145 (Mass. 2005).
195 See Howe, supra note 171.
196 Diego Ribadeneira & Victoria Benning, Panel Urges Unity on School Reform Plans,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 21, 1992, at 14.
197 Shapiro Interview, supra note 30. Ms. Shapiro explained that a number of items that
the MBAE had kept outside the foundation budget, including preschool and teacher training,
were included by the legislature in the budget without raising the overall funding. See id.
However, this appears to be incorrect. Every Child a Winner! A Proposal for a Legislative
Action Plan for Systemic Reform of Massachusetts' Public Primary and Secondary Education
System specifically states that the budget of approximately $5,600 per student includes $475
million per year for preschool and $73 million per year to provide additional salary payments
for some teachers. EVERY CHILD A WINNER!, supra note 37, at D-18. Because the ERA did
not finance preschool at all, theoretically, the foundation budget should have been lowered to
reflect that missing cost. Id.
198 Rom Interview, supra note 39; Shapiro Interview, supra note 30.
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D. HANCOCK V. COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
1. Plaintiffs' and Defendants' Strategy
In Hancock, plaintiffs employed a strategy similar to their winning
efforts in McDuffy. The Council again filed suit on behalf of nineteen
students from nineteen districts across the Commonwealth. 199 They
claimed that public education in the plaintiff districts had not improved
significantly since 1993 and that the Commonwealth was still in viola-
tion of its constitutional duty to provide students with an education. 200
They reasoned that because the foundation budget was created before the
curriculum frameworks or the MCAS test was adopted, the Common-
wealth could not predict what it would cost to provide all students with
the constitutionally required education. 20 1 Therefore, a costing-out study
was required.202
The defendants' strategy was largely determined before the plain-
tiffs filed for additional relief: focus on the last sentence of McDuffy, and
argue that the legislature had taken appropriate action within a reasona-
ble time.20 3 Deirdre Roney, chief counsel for the defendants in Hancock,
believed that the sentence was not just a throwaway, but a deliberate
standard that the court should and would apply.204 Therefore the proper
focus of the case would be on the specific actions the state had taken
over the years, and not on the quality of education in the plaintiffs'
districts.205
2. Stipulation Attempt and the Road to Trial
Attempts to reach a stipulated factual record did not go well. Un-
like in McDuffy, where the plaintiffs' attorneys enjoyed a close relation-
ship with Attorney General Harshbarger's office, relationships between
the Hancock attorneys were strained.20 6 After strongly encouraging the
199 Hancock ex reL Hancock v. Driscoll (Botsford Report), No. 02-2978, 2004 WL
877984, at *4 (Mass. Super. Apr. 26, 2004). While McDuffy was handled pro bono, Hancock
was financed mostly by the MTA and the MFr. Kevin Rothstein, Funding Advocate Puts
Money Where Her Mouth Is, BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 27, 2004, at 5.
200 Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1145 (Mass. 2005).
201 See Botsford Report, 2004 WL 877948, at *126-27.
202 Weisman Interview, supra note 50.
203 Wilkins Interview, supra note 44.
204 Roney Interview, supra note 178.
205 Id. The argument was not that money did not matter. Instead, through conversations
with staff at the Department of Education, Ms. Roney developed the idea that while money did
matter (and was greatly increased by the legislature after McDuffy), what was needed to help
failing districts meet state standards was accountability and technical assistance from the De-
partment and not more money. See id.
206 Mr. Weisman and Mr. Rom could not say enough about how different their relation-
ship with the Attorney General's ("AG") office was between McDuffy and Hancock. See Rom
Interview, supra note 39; Weisman Interview, supra note 50. Alan Rom said that the AG's
office had no interest in stipulating to anything, including "whether the sun was shining or it
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parties to reach a stipulated agreement, Justice Greaney, the single justice
with jurisdiction over the case, referred the case to then-Judge Margot
Botsford of the superior court. 207 The reference order instructed Judge
Botsford to hear the parties and their witnesses and make findings of fact
and such recommendations as she considered material. 20 8
A number of pre-trial issues illustrate key points about the Hancock
case. First, Judge Botsford and the plaintiffs agreed that a trial could not
proceed with all nineteen plaintiff districts. 20 9 Judge Botsford therefore
asked both parties to select between two and six "exemplary" districts on
which to focus factual evidence. 210 The plaintiffs agreed, but the defend-
ants refused; they agreed to select particular schools, but refused to select
any districts. 211 The plaintiffs proceeded to choose their own "focus"
districts, this time Brockton, Lowell, Springfield, and Winchendon, and
then asked the defendants to stipulate that the four districts were typical
of all nineteen plaintiff districts. 212 Defendants again refused.213 They
had commissioned Dr. Moscovitch, the economist who wrote the founda-
tion budget for the MBAE, to do a study of the plaintiff districts and,
based on his findings, concluded that none of the plaintiff districts were
typical.214
was nighttime or daytime." Rom Interview, supra note 39. Deirdre Roney characterized her
model for a relationship with opposing counsel as "a good divorce [which] requires a level of
civility." Roney Interview, supra note 178.
207 Hancock ex rel. Hancock v. Driscoll (Botsford Report), No. 02-2978, 2004 WL
877984, at *3 (Mass. Super. Apr. 26, 2004); Interview with Judge Margot Botsford, Superior
Court Judge, Superior Court of Massachusetts, in Cambridge, Mass. (Jan. 31, 2007) [hereinaf-
ter Botsford Interview]; Weisman Interview, supra note 50. Justice Botsford was nominated
to the Supreme Judicial Court by Governor Deval Patrick on July 26, 2007, and was sworn in
on September 4, 2007. See April Simpson, Patrick Hails Jurist as Ideal Pick for SJC, BOSTON
GLOBE, July 27, 2007, at B3; Steve LeBlanc, Patrick Swears in Botsford to Supreme Judicial
Court, BOSTON.COM, Sept. 4, 2007, http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/
2007/09/04/patrick-swears in botsfordtosupreme_.judicialcourt.
208 Botsford Report, 2004 WL 877984, at *3.
209 Weisman Interview, supra note 50.
210 Id.
211 Botsford Interview, supra note 207.
212 Id.
213 Id. Plaintiffs switched Leicester for Springfield. However, Springfield public schools
were extremely different in terms of performance and quality and the difference was not re-
lated to funding. Botsford Report, 2004 WL 877984, at *32. This allowed the defendants to
argue that targeted assistance from the Department of Education, not increased funding, was
what Springfield's failing schools, and all failing schools, needed in order to succeed. Brief
for Appellants Commissioner of Education et al. at 115-16, Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822
N.E.2d 1134 (Mass. 2005) (No. SJC-09267) [hereinafter Brief for Appellants]. Ms. Roney
thought the plaintiffs' choice of focus districts was a mistake. Roney Interview, supra note
178.
214 Roney Interview, supra note 178. Dr. Moscovitch called his analysis the "value ad-
ded" approach. See Botsford Report, 2004 WL 877984, at *124-25. He analyzed perform-
ance data for each school district and calculated an average proficiency score for students of
various demographic subgroups. Id. at *124. He then calculated an expected proficiency
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Second, because McDuffy assigned to the Commonwealth the re-
sponsibility of "defining the specifics and the appropriate means to pro-
vide the constitutionally-required education," the plaintiffs and Judge
Botsford asked the defendants to define the constitutionally required
minimum level of education that the Commonwealth had to provide.2 15
The defendants refused, believing that the entire inquiry was contrary to
McDuffy and that the real question was whether appropriate action had
been taken within a reasonable time. 2 16 In the absence of guidance from
the defendants, the plaintiffs presented evidence that the Commonwealth
itself considered the curriculum frameworks to be the definition of a con-
stitutionally required education, and argued that the frameworks should
therefore be the guide by which to judge education in the plaintiff dis-
tricts. 2 17 Judge Botsford agreed and so ordered.2 18
3. Trial and Judge Botsford's Report
From June 2003 to January 2004, Judge Botsford heard testimony
from 114 witnesses and accepted more than one thousand exhibits.2 19
She released a 318-page report in April 2004.220 Defendants presented
evidence of the steps the Commonwealth had taken to improve education
throughout the state. Their witnesses testified, and Judge Botsford
found, that the curriculum frameworks were world class documents of
exceptional quality, the teacher certification requirements were among
the most rigorous in the country, the school and district accountability
system was one of the first of its kind in the United States, and the
MCAS test was of high quality.22 1 However, Judge Botsford also found
that the Department of Education lacked the capacity to implement the
accountability system.22 2 The Department reviewed only twelve to four-
score for each district in the Commonwealth based on the number of students in each demo-
graphic subgroup in the district. Id. A district's "value added" was any positive difference
between its actual proficiency score and its expected proficiency score based on the model. Id.
at * 124. Moscovitch then compared districts' "value added" with their per-pupil spending and
concluded there was generally no positive relation between spending and performance. Id. at
•124-25.
215 Botsford Report, 2004 WL 877984, at *16 (quoting McDuffy v. Sec'y of Executive
Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 n.92 (Mass. 1993)); Botsford Interview, supra note 207.
216 Roney Interview, supra note 178.
217 Chairman of the Board of Education, James Peyser, and Deputy Commissioner of
Education, Mark McQuillan, testified that the curriculum frameworks were intended to imple-
ment the seven capabilities outlined in McDuffy. Brief for Appellees at 13, Hancock, 822
N.E.2d 1134 (No. SJC-09267).
218 Botsford Report, 2004 WL 877984, at * 16; Botsford Interview, supra note 207.
219 Hancock, 822 N.E.2d at 1145.
220 See generally Botsford Report, 2004 WL 877984.
221 Id. at *8-19, 113.
222 Id. at * 144.
652 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 17:621
teen schools per year, even though hundreds of schools' performances
made them eligible for accountability review. 223
Plaintiffs presented evidence of the quality of education in each of
the four focus districts, focusing on the implementation, or lack thereof,
of the curriculum frameworks, number of certified teachers, MCAS
scores, SAT scores and dropout rates, special education services, and
more.22 4 Judge Botsford found that each district was failing to provide
an educational program that conformed to the curriculum frameworks or
the seven McDuffy capabilities.2 25 In many ways, facts on the ground
were similar to those described in 1993. In Lowell high school, some
health classes had more than forty students, and the department was man-
aged by the foreign languages chair, who had no background in health.22 6
One Springfield middle school taught students in coatrooms and locker
rooms, had no science lab, and had twelve microscopes for 930 chil-
dren.2 27 Approximately forty percent of Springfield ninth-graders gradu-
ated with their class in four years.22 8 In Winchendon, no subjects were
aligned to the curriculum frameworks, there were no high school elec-
tives, and no middle school math teachers were actually certified in
math.22 9 However, Judge Botsford found that some of these problems
originated in the districts themselves. Lowell refused to spend the funds
required by the state; Springfield had both fantastic and terrible elemen-
tary schools, with variation that was not related to funding and instead
reflected problems of management and leadership; and teachers and ad-
ministrators in Winchendon were passive and did not care to make
changes in the school system. 230 Defendants chose not to present evi-
dence about the quality of education in the plaintiff districts, preferring to
elicit positive information about the districts from plaintiff witnesses on
cross examination. 23'
Both parties presented evidence about funding, which was largely
rejected by the judge. Dr. Robert Costrell, chief economist of the Com-
monwealth, testified that once a district spent one hundred percent of its
223 Id. at * 144. The Department's staff had been cut from one thousand to fewer than
four hundred at a time when its responsibilities multiplied. Id.
224 Deirdre Roney thought the plaintiffs were "trying the case that they won on ten years
ago [in McDuffy] rather than getting beyond that." Roney Interview, supra note 178. She had
thought they would have spent more time on the accountability system and how under-funded
it was. Id.
225 Botsford Report, 2004 WL 877984, at *19-37.
226 Id. at *66.
227 Id. at *27, 29.
228 Id. at *92.
229 Id. at *34.
230 Id. at *26-37. There was no evidence that any Winchendon teacher had ever attended
one of the free summer training institutes offered by the Department, and the district had never
applied for available professional development grants. Id. at *107.
231 Roney Interview, supra note 178.
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foundation budget, there was no evidence that increased spending would
improve performance. 232 Instead, student performance was largely de-
termined by district median income. 233 Dr. Moscovitch presented his
"value added" study, which showed that there was no positive correlation
between spending and performance. 234 Judge Botsford rejected both
studies and also found that the "successful schools" and "professional
judgment" funding models presented by the plaintiffs' experts were seri-
ously flawed. 235 However, she nonetheless held that the foundation
budget did not provide sufficient funds to finance the constitutionally
required education, explaining that while plaintiff districts generally
spent one hundred percent of their foundation budgets, among the top
performing seventy-five districts in the Commonwealth, actual spending
was about 130% of foundation. 236 Additionally, witnesses for both par-
ties testified that the foundation budget did not accurately reflect the cost
of an adequate education in certain areas.2 37 Judge Botsford found that
the foundation budget under-funded special education, implementation of
the curriculum frameworks, teacher salaries, bilingual education, the low
income factor, growing student enrollment, and more.238
The plaintiffs also presented voluminous testimony on remedies.
They focused on preschool because they believed that early childhood
education was critical in order to ensure the future success of children in
school,239 and witnesses for both parties unanimously agreed that high
quality preschool for three and four year olds could significantly improve
a child's performance in school, particularly for students at risk of school
232 Botsford Report, 2004 WL 877984, at * 124.
233 Id.
234 Id. at *124-25.
235 Id. at *119-25. Dr. Costrell pointed out that under the plaintiffs' "successful schools"
model, two thirds of the "successful" districts were not spending what the model deemed
"necessary" to fund an adequate education, and under the "professional judgment" model, only
five districts in the entire Commonwealth were spending enough. Id. at *121 n.152. Mr.
Weisman knew about Dr. Costrell's critiques but decided to present the costing out studies
anyway because he thought the strengths of the testimony outweighed the weaknesses. Weis-
man Interview, supra note 50.
236 Botsford Report, 2004 WL 877984, at *122-23. If these districts thought their foun-
dation budgets were sufficient to provide an adequate education, theoretically they would not
have consistently spent more.
237 Edward Moscovitch and then-Commissioner Driscoll both testified that the foundation
budget was inadequate when it came to special education. Id. at *126. The Associate Com-
missioner of Education for School Finance testified that the foundation budget underestimated
how much districts spent on teacher salaries. Id. at *127. Dr. Moscovitch advocated adding
money to the formula for building local leadership capacity and creating a formal preschool
education program. Id. at * 128. He also thought the low income factor should be increased.
Id.
238 Id. at *126-28.
239 Weisman Interview, supra note 50.
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failure due to poverty, learning disabilities, or limited English
proficiency.240
Judge Botsford concluded that while the Commonwealth had made
significant progress throughout the state, the plaintiff districts were not
implementing the curriculum frameworks or providing the constitution-
ally required education under McDuffy. 24 1 She recommended that the
defendants be ordered to ascertain and implement the actual cost of pro-
viding the level of education constitutionally required by McDuffy. 242
Items that "must" have been included in the cost study were special edu-
cation, implementation of the curriculum frameworks, facilities, and a
public preschool program for three and four year old children at risk.243
In retrospect, Judge Botsford explained that she believed the last
sentence of McDuffy retained jurisdiction but did not eliminate or in any
way lessen the Commonwealth's duty to provide students with the con-
stitutionally required education. 244 Therefore, she thought that the state's
efforts were to be judged not by whether the curriculum frameworks
were world class documents or the MCAS test was well respected, but by
how that translated into the education that children in the plaintiff dis-
tricts were receiving. 245 She also confessed that she regretted including
the remedial section in her report and thought that the SJC might have
decided Hancock differently if she had found only that the Common-
wealth was violating its constitutional duty and left the remedy to the
legislature. 246
4. Briefs of the Parties
In May 2004, Justice Greaney reserved and reported the case to the
full SJC to determine "whether, within a reasonable time, appropriate
legislative action has been taken to provide public school students with
the education required under the Massachusetts Constitution. 247
240 Botsford Report, 2004 WL 877984, at * 137. Witnesses for the plaintiffs testified that
the quality of community-based preschool programs was not as high or as consistent as public
preschool programs. Id. at *140. The plaintiffs also presented evidence on the benefits of
small class sizes (fewer than twenty students) in grades K-3 and the importance of additional
services beyond the regular school day for children at risk. Id. at *141-42.
241 Id. at *143.
242 Id. at '145.
243 Id. at "146. Items that "should" have been considered for inclusion were teacher sala-
ries, the low income factor, and the bilingual factor; other proposed factors for technology,
teacher coaches, and school leadership; class sizes of fewer than twenty for grades Kindergar-
ten through 3; school libraries; and remedial programs such as tutoring, extended day, and
extended year. Id. at *147.
244 Botsford Interview, supra note 207.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1146 (Mass. 2005). This framing of
the issue illustrates how the "appropriate action/reasonable time" inquiry can be equivalent to
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The parties' briefs reflected their views of the issue and were there-
fore extremely different. Whereas in McDuffy the parties had stated the
issue identically, the Hancock parties stated the issue alternatively as: 1)
whether appropriate action within a reasonable time had been taken and
the remedy ordered by the superior court violated separation of pow-
ers,248 and 2) whether the Commonwealth was providing plaintiff chil-
dren with the minimum level of education required by the constitution
and the relief ordered by the superior court was proper.249
Defendant-appellants did not contend that any of Judge Botsford's
findings were clearly erroneous, believing that the case would be won or
lost on the standard the court employed. 250 However, they portrayed
Judge Botsford as having found that the Commonwealth violated its con-
stitutional duty because the focus districts did not have educational out-
comes equal to the comparison districts. 25' They argued that because
funding disparities between poor and wealthy districts had narrowed,
closed, or even reversed, funding had to be adequate, because wealthy
districts could not be expected to under-fund themselves. 252 In addition,
they claimed that actual spending would obviously be higher than foun-
dation budget in wealthy districts because foundation budgets in wealthy
districts were lower to begin with.253 They characterized the plaintiffs as
arguing that "across-the-board, unrestricted spending increases [were] a
the "are the plaintiffs receiving the constitutionally mandated education" inquiry. If appropri-
ate action is defined as action which provides all students with the constitutionally required
education, then appropriate action would not have been taken unless all students were receiv-
ing the education mandated by McDuffy. However, the plaintiffs did not spend a significant
amount of time pushing this interpretation of "appropriate" in their briefs; the issue is first
discussed on page 99. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 217, at 99-100. The defendants
avoided defining "appropriate" altogether. When pressed for a definition, Ms. Roney defined
"appropriate" in terms of approaches within the broad range of accepted educational choice
and within the range of what other states have done. Roney Interview, supra note 178.
248 See Brief for Appellants, supra note 213, at 1-2.
249 See Brief for Appellees, supra note 217, at 1.
250 Roney Interview, supra note 178.
251 Brief for Appellants, supra note 213, at 15. Judge Botsford focused on whether the
plaintiff schools were implementing the curriculum frameworks and the McDuffy capabilities.
She did not mandate "equal" results, unless all students receiving an adequate education could
be construed as "equal." See Hancock ex rel. Hancock v. Driscoll (Botsford Report), No. 02-
2978, 2004 WL 877984, at *16-37 (Mass. Super. Apr. 26, 2004).
252 Brief for Appellants, supra note 213, at 29. This contention implicitly denies a major
assumption of the foundation budget-that poor schools need more money than wealthy
schools in order to provide their students with an adequate education.
253 Id. at 113; Reply Brief for Appellants at 14, Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d
1134 (Mass. 2005) (No. SJC-09267). This reflected the fact that wealthier districts had less
needy student populations and, according to the ERA, required less money to provide those
students with an adequate education than poor districts. The fact that wealthy districts spent
above their foundation budgets still showed that they believed that the foundation funding
level was not sufficient to provide their students with the kind of education they wanted to
provide. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 217, at 117-18.
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better way to improve student performance in struggling schools and dis-
tricts than accountability and targeted assistance. '2 54 As such, they
stressed, it was the province of the legislature, not the court, to decide
how to help failing schools.255 Therefore, their argument concluded, the
appropriate inquiry in Hancock was not the level of education provided
in the focus districts, but whether the Commonwealth had taken appro-
priate action within a reasonable time.256 This standard properly placed
responsibility for education policy in the elected branches. In contrast,
Judge Botsford's attempt to mandate particular education policy choices,
especially with regard to preschool, violated the separation of powers. 257
Plaintiff-appellees spent the first eighty pages of their brief largely
repeating Judge Botsford's findings and conclusions.2 58 Eventually, they
contended that the Commonwealth was attempting to shift the inquiry
from whether the constitutional mandate was being met to whether ap-
propriate action had been taken within a reasonable time, a task it de-
fined as improvement, not compliance. 259 According to plaintiffs, the
constitution required more from the Commonwealth than doing its
best.2 60 McDuffy did not hold that "improvement, however marginal and
regardless of how many thousands of children [were] leaving school un-
equipped with the seven capabilities and ill equipped to succeed in life,
[was] constitutionally sufficient. '' 26' In fact, whether appropriate action
within a reasonable time had been taken had to be judged with regard to
whether all students in the plaintiff districts were receiving the constitu-
tionally required minimum level of education. 262 Creating academic
standards, a student assessment system, and teacher certifications that
were national models was not constitutionally sufficient if such programs
were not being implemented in the plaintiff districts. 263 In addition, ad-
dressing school failure through accountability and targeted assistance
from the Department of Education was ineffective because Judge Bot-
254 Brief for Appellants, supra note 213, at 114.
255 Id. at 126-28.
256 Id. at 119-20.
257 Id. at 123-28.
258 See Brief for Appellees, supra note 217, at 6-81.
259 Id. at 96-99.
260 Id. at 5-6. The court disagreed. See Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134,
1152-53 (Mass. 2005). Mr. Weisman explained that he thought appropriate action within a
reasonable time was "the most absurd argument I'd ever heard" because it would mean hold-
ing adults to a lower standard than children. Weisman Interview, supra note 50. Children
who wanted to graduate high school had to pass the MCAS; effort was not sufficient. Id.
According to Weisman, holding that effort was sufficient for the state would be ridiculous.
261 Brief for Appellees, supra note 217, at 96-97.
262 Id. at 99. This point was not stressed and was first mentioned on page 97.
263 Id. at 102.
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sford found that the Department was "not currently adequate to do thejob."264
Lastly, the plaintiffs addressed the defendants' separation of powers
arguments. They tried to characterize additional school funding and pub-
lic preschool as constitutional mandates, not policy choices.265 They
also analogized to the Abbott v. Burke litigation in New Jersey, claiming
that both state supreme courts faced a "failure to educate that has per-
sisted for decades," 266 and therefore needed to implement a remedy to
correct longstanding constitutional violations. 267
5. Oral Argument and the Hancock Decision
Oral argument went terribly for the plaintiffs. The justices' ques-
tions are discussed further below, but it is sufficient to note that plain-
tiffs' attorney Alan Rom said he knew the plaintiffs would lose after
attending oral argument. 268
The SJC decision reaffirmed McDuffy's constitutional mandate and
praised Judge Botsford's report, but found that the Commonwealth was
meeting "its constitutional charge to 'cherish the interests of ... public
schools.' "269 Chief Justice Margaret H. Marshall, for a plurality consist-
ing of herself, Justice Francis X. Spina, and Justice Robert J. Cordy,
stated that the appropriate inquiry was, "whether, within a reasonable
time, appropriate legislative action has been taken to provide public
school students with the education required under the Massachusetts
Constitution. '270 She openly acknowledged that serious inadequacies in
public education remained, the goals of education reform had not yet
been achieved, and the plaintiffs were not being well served by their
schools. 271 However, Marshall stressed that the public school system
was radically different from the one reviewed in McDuffy. "A system
mired in failure has given way to one that, although far from perfect,
shows a trajectory of progress. '272 The elected branches were continuing
to make education reform a priority and had undertaken a long-term,
systematic, quantifiable and comprehensive process of reform to provide
a high quality education to each child in the Commonwealth.2 73 Where,
264 Id. at 121 (quoting Hancock ex rel. Hancock v. Driscoll (Botsford Report), No. 02-
2978, 2004 WL 877984, at *144 (Mass. Super. Apr. 26, 2004)).
265 Id. at 144.
266 Id. at 148.
267 In the Abbott litigation, the New Jersey Supreme Court ordered preschool and full-day
Kindergarten. Id. at 148, 153.
268 Rom Interview, supra note 39.
269 Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1136-39 (Mass. 2005).
270 Id. at 1146.
271 Id. at 1139-40.
272 Id. at 1139.
273 Id. at 1140.
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as in this case, "the independent branches of government have shown
that they share the court's concern, and that they are embracing and act-
ing on their constitutional duty to educate all public school students," the
court could not conclude that judicial intervention was required.2 74
Justice Judith A. Cowin and Justice Martha B. Sosman con-
curred. 275 They argued that the Education Clause did not impose any
judicially enforceable duty on the Commonwealth and that, "instead, the
clause should be construed as a broad directive, intended to establish the
central importance of education in the Commonwealth and clarify that
the legislative and executive branches will be responsible for the creation
and maintenance of our public school system. '276
Justice Greaney-the only Hancock justice who had decided
McDuffy-and Justice Roderick L. Ireland both dissented. 277 Justice
Greaney argued that statewide academic and teacher certification stan-
dards and student assessment systems could not satisfy the Common-
wealth's constitutional duty if they were not being implemented in
plaintiff districts.27 The changes enacted by the legislature "must be
judged on results and not on effort (no matter how praiseworthy)." 279
Justice Greaney contended that Justice Marshall effectively overruled
McDuffy by finding that the Commonwealth had fulfilled its constitu-
tional duty through effort, not through results. 280 Justice Ireland argued
similarly. 2 8 1
II. INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS, POLITICS, AND
LEGISLATIVE GOOD FAITH
The Hancock court held that the Commonwealth was not violating
its constitutional duty to cherish the public schools.282 This reinterprets
McDuffy into an effort-based, rather than an outcome-based standard.
274 Id. at 1155.
275 Id. at 1159 (Cowin, J., concurring).
276 Id. at 1159 (Cowin, J., concurring). The concurring opinion is a bit unclear. At times
the justices seem to say that McDuffy should be overruled and the Education Clause should be
interpreted to impose no constitutional duty on the Commonwealth at all; at other times they
seem to say that the Education Clause should impose a constitutional duty to provide for
public schools, albeit a duty that is not judicially enforceable, arguing that the main problem
with the McDuffy decision was the Rose factors. See id. at 1159-65 (Cowin, J., concurring).
277 Justice Greaney and Justice Ireland each wrote separate dissenting opinions, but joined
in each other's opinions. See Id. at 1165 (Greaney, J., dissenting); id. at 1173 (Ireland, J.,
dissenting).
278 Id. at 166-69 (Greaney, J., dissenting).
279 Id. at 1169 (Greaney, J., dissenting).
280 Id. at 1171 (Greaney, J., dissenting).
281 He accused Justice Marshall of implicitly overruling McDuffy by finding that the
state's "painfully slow" progress satisfied the Commonwealth's constitutional duty. Id. at
1175 (Ireland, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 1154).
282 Id. at 1136-37, 1140.
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McDuffy held that a constitutional education requires providing students
with the seven Rose capabilities. 283 However, the Hancock court did not
consider whether children in the plaintiff districts were being provided
with the seven capabilities. 284 Instead, it found that the Commonwealth
was not neglecting its constitutional duty and therefore judicial interven-
tion was not required.28 5
Three factors help explain what led the court to reach this conclu-
sion in Hancock. First, the court was aware of its own institutional con-
straints and concerns regarding its judicial role uniquely relevant to
Hancock and the implementation of a remedy that would require in-
creased funding for education. It intentionally chose not to impose a
remedial order because it feared provoking inter-branch conflict. Sec-
ond, the court's fears reflected its implicit and largely correct assumption
that there was a lack of political will among policy elites, the legislature,
the executive branch, and the public at large for investing substantial new
money in underperforming districts. Third, the court believed that the
legislative and executive branches acted in good faith to fulfill their con-
stitutional duties under McDuffy and had been met with a fair amount of
success statewide. The court felt that given the political branches' seri-
ous and intensive efforts to fulfill the constitutional mandate, judicial
interference, even in the form of a finding of constitutional violation,
would be inappropriate.
A. THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT'S FEAR OF ITS OWN
INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS
Concerns about inter-branch conflict and the judiciary's role played
a part in Hancock.286 In the days following the decision, Beacon Hill
legislators and others openly speculated that the desire to avoid another
standoff with the legislature motivated the court's ruling.287 The editor-
in-chief of Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly acknowledged that while no
one could "put their finger on it and say for sure there is some political
283 McDuffy v. Sec'y of Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993).
284 Many have doubted from the start that the SJC would ever try to enforce the seven
capabilities, believing them to be more of an aspiration than a concrete constitutional require-
ment. See Birmingham Interview, supra note 120; Wilkins Interview, supra note 44. This
highlights the distinction between courts declaring constitutional violations and implementing
remedies. While the seven capabilities were adopted in order to define the Commonwealth's
constitutional obligation, one could argue that the capabilities themselves constitute, or at least
require, a particular remedy.
285 Hancock, 822 N.E.2d at 1140.
286 These concerns were largely irrelevant in McDuffy because the court knew that the
legislature had passed or was about to pass comprehensive legislation. Therefore, the decision
could not have caused inter-branch conflict.
287 Michael Levenson & Jonathan Saltzman, Legislators Praise Ruling on Poor Districts,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 21, 2005, at BI.
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wrangling going on here," many people thought "that there might be ex-
actly something like that going on-that somewhere in the analysis of
this decision, some of the SJC justices thought it might not be the wisest
thing to start another ... standoff with the Legislature. 288
The Hancock justices previously clashed with the legislature over
taxes, elections, and, most famously, same-sex marriage. 289 In 1998,
Massachusetts voters passed a clean elections law to provide for public
funding of political campaigns, and although it was never repealed, the
legislature refused to fund it.29O In February, 2002, the SJC held that the
constitution required the legislature to finance clean elections. 291 The
legislature refused.292 In April, 2002, Justice Sosman ruled that the SJC
would auction off state property if the legislature continued to refuse to
fund the act.293 In response to the "darkest moment yet in the relation-
ship between the Legislature and the judiciary," a top lieutenant of the
state house speaker introduced a budget rider to strip the justices of the
power to hire their own personnel, including secretaries and law
clerks.294 A year and a half later, in Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health, the SJC held that the refusal to grant marriage licenses to same-
sex couples lacked a rational basis and violated the state constitution. 295
The senate then asked the court to clarify whether a proposed civil union
bill, which would have prohibited same-sex marriage but permitted civil
unions with all the benefits, rights, and responsibilities of marriage,
would violate the constitution.29 6 The court said that it would.297 It is
impossible to overstate the intense public and legislative scrutiny that
Goodridge provoked. One representative filed a bill to have the four
justices in the majority removed, a measure that had been attempted only
twice in the Commonwealth's history, most recently in 1922.298 Five
people interviewed for this Article suggested that Goodridge and the
288 Id.
289 All of the justices who decided Hancock were appointed to the SJC by 2001. See
Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court, http://www.massreports.com/justices/AlIJustices.htm
(last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
290 Bates v. Dir. of Office of Campaign and Political Fin., 763 N.E.2d 6, 9 (Mass. 2002).
291 Id. at 11.
292 House Member Blasts Legislative Leaders, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 7, 2002, at B3.
293 Rick Klein, SJC Ready to Sell State Property to Pay for Clean Elections, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 6, 2002, at B3.
294 Frank Phillips, Judges Watch as Legislators Ready a Power Play; Analysts See Threat
to Judicial Authority, BOSTON GLOBE, May 7, 2002, at BI.
295 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
296 In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 566 (Mass. 2004).
297 Id. at 572.
298 Raphael Lewis, Foes of Gay Marriage Try Long Shot: Bill Seeks to Remove Four of
SJC Justices, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 20, 2004, at B 1. Months later the SJC struck down a
capital gains tax increase that had been made effective May 1, 2002. See generally Peterson v.
Comm'r of Revenue, 806 N.E.2d 78 (Mass. 2004). The court held that the increase violated a
constitutional requirement that all property be taxed at the same rate during the same calendar
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clean elections case may have impacted the court's decision in Han-
cock;299 only one person doubted that the cases played a role. 3° °
More importantly, during oral argument, the justices themselves in-
dicated that they were concerned about their judicial role and their ability
to implement any decision that would require increased funding for edu-
cation.30' Justice Greaney, who dissented in Hancock because he sup-
ported a finding of liability for the Commonwealth, asked Ms. Roney
what would happen if the court ordered the legislature to fund universal
preschool, and the legislature responded that it did not have the money.
"What are we supposed to do? There's nothing we can do, right?" 30 2
Later, he suggested that before courts "bite off big constitutional issues,"
they have to think about how they are going to enforce their orders. 30 3
"Now, we learned in clean elections that that turned out to be extremely
difficult, and ended up, in my opinion, to be a stalemate between us and
the legislature. ' '3°4 Greaney explained that Goodridge was different be-
cause it was easily enforceable; the court could just order the issuance of
marriage licenses. 30 5 However, any costing-out study in Hancock would
end with someone asking the court to order the legislature to appropriate
more money, and courts in other states that had gone down this route had
ended up in "quagmires. '30 6 Justice Sosman, who concurred in Han-
cock, agreed that a remedial order would get the court into "very treach-
erous waters. '307 Chief Justice Marshall asked what would happen if
"you identify the measures that are necessary and then the Common-
wealth comes back and says 'there's absolutely no way. We've gone to
the legislature and the legislature hasn't funded those.' "308
Justice Cowin, who also concurred, thought the entire area was one
for the legislature, not the court. She asked, "Why is it up to the court to
mandate mandatory preschool? ... Isn't that something for the legisla-
year. The ruling aggravated an already tense relationship between the legislature and the
court.
299 Birmingham Interview, supra note 120; Blum Interview, supra note 125; Reville In-
terview, supra note 69; Rom Interview, supra note 39; Interview with Jarrett Barrios, Former
Senator, Massachusetts State Senate, in Boston, Mass. (Feb. 14, 2007) [hereinafter Barrios
Interview]. Barrios served as a state senator from 2002-2007 and resigned in May of 2007 to
become president of the Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts Foundation. See Michael
Levenson, Barrios Set to Resign from State Senate-Says He Will Head Health Foundation,
BOSTON GLOBE, May 23, 2007, at B1.
300 Botsford Interview, supra note 207.
301 See supra note 18.







662 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 17:621
ture to decide?" 309 She then told Mr. Weisman that he was asking them
to "step into education and policy. Won't there always be someone to
say that education isn't sufficient?" 310 These comments and questions
make it clear that at least some of the justices were concerned about the
judiciary's role, the court's institutional constraints, and how the court
would implement any remedy that required the Commonwealth to take
further action to provide the plaintiffs with an adequate education.
B. LACK OF POLITICAL INTEREST IN INVESTING NEW MONEY IN
UNDERPERFORMING DISTRICTS
As discussed above, implicit in the justices' concerns about institu-
tional competence, implementation of a judicial remedy, and inter-branch
conflict was the assumption that education reform and the plaintiffs' case
no longer enjoyed the type of broad based support they did during
McDuffy. Stated otherwise, the court's concerns over how it would im-
plement a judicial remedy would have been irrelevant if there had been
substantial political support for the remedies the plaintiffs sought. This
can be understood most clearly from McDuffy, where the legislature
passed the Education Reform Act of 1993 before the court decision was
handed down.311 The political situation shielded the McDuffy court from
any fear of provoking the legislature with a major constitutional ruling.
This section explores the politics of education reform during the time of
Hancock and concludes that the court was correct in believing that a
majority of policy elites, members of the public, and the legislative and
executive branches did not support increased funding for plaintiff dis-
tricts as a main component of education reform.
1. Policy Elites Involved in McDuffy or the Education Reform
Act
A number of people and organizations that were instrumental in se-
curing the ERA's passage and supported the plaintiffs in McDuffy felt
differently about education reform and the Hancock suit ten years later.
While a number of them supported a finding of liability for the Common-
wealth, none thought that increased funding for plaintiff districts should
be a main component of a new round of education reform.
Dr. Edward Moscovitch, the author of the foundation budget for the
MBAE, testified for the defendants in Hancock that, in high poverty dis-
tricts, there was "no positive relation between spending and perform-
309 Id.
310 Id.
311 See supra Part I.B.
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ance. '' 312 The day before oral argument, Dr. Moscovitch told the Boston
Globe that "[t]he single biggest thing holding us back is not money. '"313
Instead, "principals and teachers don't . . . know how to turn schools
around, and the (Education) Department has not been in a position to
implement a program to help them to do it.'314
Paul Reville, co-founder of the MBAE and supporter of the plain-
tiffs in McDuffy, testified for the defendants in Hancock.315 He felt am-
bivalent about the suit but was concerned that more money, by itself,
would not help struggling districts. 316 His main focus during the Han-
cock era was on increased school time for at-risk students and capacity
building to teach teachers how to bring all students to proficiency, not on
an increase in the foundation budget. 317
The MBAE also did not see increasing the foundation budget as a
major priority for education reform. In 2002, it published a report that
called intervention in districts that could not teach their students the
"next big issue faced by education reform. ' 318 It called for a strategy of
bringing outside change agents into underperforming districts:
MBAE believes that we must recognize that inherent
structural flaws and ineffective local management can
prevent the changes in curriculum, personnel and leader-
ship that would lead to genuine improvements. We must
be willing to challenge the status quo by shifting power
away from those individuals and institutions that have
not used it effectively. 319
312 Hancock ex rel. Hancock v. Driscoll (Botsford Report), No. 02-2978, 2004 WL
877984, at * 124-25 (Mass. Super. Apr. 26, 2004). For a discussion of Dr. Moscovitch's testi-
mony regarding costs that should be added to the foundation budget, see supra note 237.
313 Jonathan Saltzman, SJC Set to Weigh School Funding; Hundreds of Millions in State
Aid at Stake, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 3, 2004, at Al.
314 Id. Similarly, Dr. Moscovitch published an article in 2004 praising Judge Botsford's
report but arguing that schools improve through data-driven instruction, something that more
money would not necessarily ensure. Edward Moscovitch, Passing Judgment: What it Will
Take to Make Schools Constitutionally Adequate, COMMONWEALTH, Summer 2004, at 9,
11-12.
315 Reville Interview, supra note 69.
316 Id. Mr. Reville thought that the Commonwealth had made a substantial effort, and he
feared that if the adequacy arguments were pushed too strongly it could allow teachers and
schools to escape accountability. Id.
317 Id.; Scott Lehigh, Op-Ed, The Case for Longer School Days, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 19,
2005, at A 15.
318 Massachusetts Business Alliance for Education, Intervening in Low Performing Dis-
tricts: An Effective Strategy ii (Dec. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Massa-
chusetts Business Alliance for Education), available at http://www.mbae.org/uploads/131020
03120347MBAElnterventionPaper.doc.
319 Id. at 2.
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This strategy was directly at odds with the interests of the education
establishment, who were represented on the Council and allied with the
Hancock plaintiffs. The MBAE filed an amicus brief in Hancock con-
tending that students in the plaintiff districts were not receiving a consti-
tutional education under McDuffy. 320 However, they did not support
Judge Botsford's conclusion that a lack of funding constituted an impor-
tant and independent cause of the failure in plaintiff districts. Therefore,
they argued, it was "premature to require substantial new expenditures of
public funds before the schools and districts that will receive new re-
sources have the capacity to use those resources effectively." 321
Lastly, Senator Tom Birmingham and Representative Mark
Roosevelt, champions of the ERA in the legislature, did not support
plaintiffs' case. Before the plaintiffs filed Hancock, they met numerous
times with Senator Birmingham's staff, who indicated that the senator
thought any attempt to return to court would be premature while the leg-
islature was fully funding the foundation budget.322 Representative
Roosevelt had already left the legislature and was the executive director
of the MBAE while Hancock was pending. 323 In an article in Common-
Wealth Magazine, he contended that without management reforms, in-
cluding administrative power to remove poorly performing teachers,
"additional resources sent directly to local districts might be inefficient
or simply wasteful. '32 4
2. The Executive Branch
While the former Commissioner of Education and the Board of Ed-
ucation arguably wanted to lose in McDuffy, this was certainly not true
for the executive branch in Hancock.32 5 Then-Commissioner David
320 Brief of Amici Curiae Massachusetts Business Alliance for Education, supra note 174,
at 11-15.
321 Id. at 7.
322 Birmingham Interview, supra note 120.
323 See Mark Roosevelt, Remedy Lies in New Goals, New Strategies, COMMONWEALTH,
Fall 2004, at 87, 90.
324 Id. at 89. A week after Hancock was decided, Roosevelt published an Op-Ed in the
Boston Globe arguing that once a certain level of spending had been reached, school reform
was about more than money. See Mark Roosevelt, Op-Ed, Unfinished Business: Real Reform,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 20, 2005, at DI. He claimed that the education reform battle was be-
tween "those who are willing to take on powerful institutional interests and contemplate sys-
temic change and those who are not" and characterized Hancock as a suit by the unions to
divert attention from real reform. Id.
325 However, there were still Department employees who made statements that were help-
ful to the plaintiffs in Hancock. During his deposition, Deputy Education Commissioner Mark
McQuillan agreed that some districts did not have sufficient resources to fully implement the
curriculum frameworks. See Anand Vaishnav, New Lawsuit Attacks Public School Funding,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 13, 2003, at B7; Weisman Interview, supra note 50. The AG's office
submitted 110 corrections to his 120 minute deposition, and the plaintiffs called McQuillan as
their first witness at the Hancock trial. Weisman Interview, supra note 50.
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Driscoll testified that the foundation formula yielded adequate funding
for Commonwealth schools. 326 Indeed, Deidre Roney noted that he was
"solidly behind" the defense, and Judge Botsford called him a "shill for
the administration. ' 327 Additionally, then-Governor Mitt Romney made
it abundantly clear that he did not think more money was the answer for
improving failing schools. 328 His administration's chief economist, Dr.
Robert M. Costrell, was the defense's star witness on funding and spent
countless hours working on the case and speaking to the media about
how increased spending would not lead to increased school or student
performance. 329
3. The Legislature
Senator Jarrett Barrios and sixty other state legislators submitted an
amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs in Hancock.330 The purpose of
the brief was to "show the SJC there was broad support for [the plain-
tiff's case and requested relief] so [the justices] didn't feel like they were
'meddling' in what [was] the legislature's duty."' 33' The message, how-
ever, did not get through. Ultimately, the court was seemingly correct in
its implicit assessment of the legislature's lack of political interest in
greatly increasing funding in the plaintiff districts or embarking on a sec-
ond round of comprehensive education reform.
By 2002, both Representative Roosevelt and Senator Birmingham
had left the state legislature; no major champions of the ERA or school
funding arose to take their place. 332 Senator Barrios implied that there
was a sense of "been there, done that" when it came to education re-
form. 333 Education in grades Kindergarten through twelve had taken pri-
ority over all other sectors in the 1990s, and by the time the Act was fully
326 Hancock ex rel. Hancock v. Driscoll (Botsford Report), No. 02-2978, 2004 WL
877984, at * 126, 129 (Mass. Super. Apr. 26, 2004). Commissioner Driscoll retired on August
31, 2007. See Press Release, Mass. Dep't of Educ., Deputy to Serve as Acting Commissioner
After Education Chief Retires (Apr. 24, 2007), available at http://www.doe.mass.edu/news/
news.asp?id=3384.
327 Botsford Interview, supra note 207; Roney Interview, supra note 178.
328 See, e.g., Scott S. Greenberger, With Suit Pending, School Aid Gets Second Look,
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 11, 2004, at B I.
329 Deirdre Roney sometimes got emails from Dr. Costrell at 3:00 a.m. with new ideas for
the case. Roney Interview, supra note 178. For an example of Dr. Costrell's work, see Robert
M. Costrell, Wrong Answer on School Finances, COMMONWEALTH, Fall 2004, at 79.
330 See Brief of Amici Curiae, Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134 (Mass.
2005) (No. SJC-09267).
331 Barrios Interview, supra note 299.
332 Representative Roosevelt left the legislature to run for Governor in 1994. See Michael
Kenney, Kicking Off the City Campaigns, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 25, 1994, at 3. Senator Bir-
mingham did the same in 2002. See John Laidler, Travaglini Faces Final Hurdle in Bid for
Senate Presidency, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 24, 2002, at 3.
333 Barrios Interview, supra note 299.
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funded in 2000, many legislators thought it was time to concentrate on
other things. 334 Further, the foundation budget formula was not popular
in the state house. Many legislators, especially those representing fast-
growing suburban communities, thought the formula was short-changing
his or her district.335 Additional pressure was placed on the legislature in
2000 when a coalition of suburban districts began a vigorous lobbying
effort to get more state money for their schools. 336 Senator Barrios ex-
plained that the "magic of changing the formula [became] everybody has
to do better, or else you're not going to get the votes. ' 337 Thus, a suc-
cessful legislative attempt to increase the foundation budgets for failing
schools would have meant a concomitant increase for wealthy schools. 338
No Council groups ever seriously pushed a bill as comprehensive as
Judge Botsford's remedy before filing for additional relief.339 The MTA
and other Council groups lobbied for foundation budget increases for
plaintiff districts while Hancock was pending, but they never coalesced a
movement centered on increasing state funding for underperforming
schools. 340 The MBAE was no longer active in lobbying at this point. 341
Many legislators dropped bills for their favorite projects, but there was
no comprehensive vision for where the state should be headed on educa-
tion reform.342
334 Birmingham Interview, supra note 120; Blum Interview, supra note 125; Reville In-
terview, supra note 69.
335 Barrios Interview, supra note 299.
336 Brian C. Mooney, School Funding Under Scrutiny; Growing Suburbs Call Formula
Unfair, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 10, 2000, at Bi. See Birmingham Interview, supra note 120;
Blum Interview, supra note 125. The effort eventually paid off. In July, 2006, the legislature
enacted a bill guaranteeing that within four years, each district would receive at least 17.5% of
its foundation budget from state aid. See James Vaznis, Suburbs Big Aid Winners; City Dis-
tricts Get Smaller Increases, BOSTON GLOBE, July 16, 2006, at 1. Under the original formula,
some wealthy districts received less than 10% of their foundation budgets from the state. See
id.; Shapiro Interview, supra note 30.
337 Barrios Interview, supra note 299.
338 Id.
339 Senator Birmingham said the MTA's top priorities at the time were getting rid of
charter schools and securing early retirement for teachers. Birmingham Interview, supra note
120. Senator Barrios confirmed that there was no major lobbying effort aimed at increasing
the foundation budget until 2004. Barrios Interview, supra note 299.
340 For example, in 2003, the MTA introduced "A Bill to Ensure Adequate Resources to
Help All Students Achieve." See Massachusetts Teachers Association, MTA's Bill to Ensure
Adequate Resources to Help All Students Achieve, JUST THE FACTS, Jan. 20, 2003 (on file with
author). By raising the sales tax one percent, the bill would have increased the foundation
budget to provide for no more than fifteen students per class in kindergarten through third
grade, full day kindergarten, $1,000 in remediation funding for each student who failed
MCAS, preschool for three and four year olds, a minimum teacher salary of $42,000, increased
special education and low income factors, and additional money for building assistance. Id.
341 Jack Rennie's death in early 2001 left a leadership gap not only in the MBAE, but in
the greater world of Massachusetts education reform. See Editorial, Rennie's Achievement,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 18, 2001, at A18.
342 Blum Interview, supra note 125; Reville Interview, supra note 69.
2008] INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS, POLITICS, AND GOOD FAITH 667
Even as Hancock progressed, it remained a lawsuit that many peo-
ple did not follow; it never created enough momentum to initiate a sec-
ond round of education reform as McDuffy did for the ERA. 343 After
Judge Botsford released her report and the SJC heard oral argument, Sen-
ator Barrios introduced a bill to create a panel that would have calculated
the cost of providing an adequate education in all underperforming dis-
tricts. 344 The legislation was supported by the MTA, the ACLU, and
other Council groups. 345 Despite more than half of the members of both
houses of the legislature signing on to the bill, it never went anywhere
before Hancock was decided because the house and senate leadership did
not support it.346
4. Public Opinion and The Boston Globe
Most people were likely not paying much attention to Hancock or
lobbying efforts in the legislature, and there was not widespread public
support for a massive increase in funding to underperforming schools.
Weeks before the Hancock decision, a poll by Mass Insight Education
found that only 21% of Massachusetts adults surveyed thought that
schools needed more money. 347 MTA polls also revealed that most peo-
ple believed that education had improved.34 On the contrary, in Decem-
ber, 1992, 50 to 66% of voters supported raising the sales tax as long as
it was linked to education.349 The Boston Globe, which had been solidly
behind the plaintiffs in McDuffy, later published several articles question-
ing whether more money mattered. For example, an editorial in Septem-
ber 2004 argued that "money isn't the biggest factor in the next round of
education reform at the elementary, middle, and high school levels. '350
The Globe later called Hancock "an educated ruling," which recognized
that "it will take more than adjustments to the state education funding
formula to improve failing schools. '351
343 Reville Interview, supra note 69. See also Blum Interview, supra note 125.
344 Scott S. Greenberger, Panel to Study Schools Debated, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 15,
2004, at B4.
345 Id.
346 Senator Antonioni, then senate chair of the joint education committee, declined to sign
on to the bill because he did not think that significant new money would be involved in any
new education reform efforts. Id.; Blum Interview, supra note 125.
347 Maria Sacchetti, Group Seeks to Lift Worst State Schools, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 2,
2005, at Al.
348 See Blum Interview, supra note 125.
349 Peter J. Howe, Weld Seeks 'Rescue' of School Bill, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 23, 1992, at
1.
350 Editorial, Greater Expectations, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 16, 2004, at A 18.
351 Editorial, An Educated Ruling, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 16, 2005, at A 18.
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C. THE COMMONWEALTH'S GOOD FAITH EFFORT AND STATEWIDE
SUCCESS
The court's recognition of its own institutional constraints and cor-
rect assessment of the lack of political interest in providing substantial
additional funding for underperforming districts helps to explain why the
SJC refused to order Judge Botsford's proposed remedies. It does not,
however, adequately explain why the SJC refused to find that the Com-
monwealth was violating its constitutional duty to educate plaintiff chil-
dren.352 Justice Greaney, who was most vocal during oral argument in
expressing concerns about implementing a judicial remedy, supported a
finding of liability for the Commonwealth. 353 In addition, many legisla-
tors and policy elites agreed that the Commonwealth was violating its
constitutional duty, at least as articulated by McDuffy. 354 A finding of a
constitutional violation without specifying a remedy would likely not
have precipitated a major conflict between the legislative and judicial
branches. Nonetheless, the SJC still found that the Commonwealth was
fulfilling its constitutional duty to "cherish the interests of public
schools. '355 This was largely because the plurality believed that the
Commonwealth had acted in good faith to improve education in the
plaintiff districts and comply with the McDuffy ruling and was on the
right path to success. This belief was bolstered by the fact that Massa-
chusetts was a high-performing state and many of its efforts were nation-
wide models for education reform.
1. The Commonwealth's Good Faith and Correct Path
Both at oral argument and in the written opinions, the justices ex-
pressed the belief that the Commonwealth had acted in good faith to
remedy constitutional violations and was on the correct path to success,
and that the court should therefore not get involved. At oral argument,
Justice Sosman stated, "Whatever the situation in particular districts, we
are not confronted with a recalcitrant legislature that has refused to do
anything to address these educational flaws. '356 Similarly, Chief Justice
352 The distinction between courts as finders of violations versus crafters of remedies
underlies Judge Botsford's suggestion that the SJC might have decided Hancock differently on
the constitutional violation question if she had limited her report to only finding a constitu-
tional violation and not crafting a politically controversial remedy. See Botsford Interview,
supra note 207.
353 See Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1165-73 (Mass. 2005) (Greaney,
J., dissenting); Audio tape of Hancock Oral Argument, supra note 19.
354 See Roosevelt, supra note 323, at 87, 88; Barrios interview, supra note 299. See
generally supra, Part ll.B.
355 See Hancock, 822 N.E.2d at 1136.
356 Audio tape of Hancock Oral Argument, supra note 19.
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Marshall explained, "The commonwealth, DOE, has every interest in
seeing every child educated. It has proceeded in good faith. 357
The plurality opinion could not say enough about how the Com-
monwealth had made a serious, good faith effort to improve education
throughout the state. 358 Chief Justice Marshall explained that "the legis-
lative and executive branches have shown that they have embarked on a
long-term, measurable, orderly, and comprehensive process of re-
form. '359 She contrasted the Massachusetts experience with reform ef-
forts in New Jersey and New York, where
The respective courts stepped in, only reluctantly, after
many years of legislative failure or inability to enact ed-
ucation reforms and to commit resources to implement
those reforms .... In sharp contrast, the Massachusetts
Legislature and Governor responded ... with a compre-
hensive and systematic overhaul of State financial aid to
and oversight of public schools. The level of responsive,
sustained, intense legislative commitment to public edu-
cation established on the record in this case is the kind of
government action the Abbott and CFE court, in the re-
spective underlying cases, had hoped to see from their
Legislatures, and reluctantly concluded would not be
forthcoming without a detailed court order.360
The justices also believed, as did many in political and public cir-
cles, that the Commonwealth was on the right track to improving un-
derperforming districts and that additional funding was not the answer.
For example, at oral argument, Justice Sosman asked Mr. Weisman,
"What we have before us is information about four districts with some
serious problems. What is irrational or wrong or unconstitutional about
an approach that says 'what we are going to do with those not doing well
is go in and find out what the specific problem is, school by school'?" 361
Justice Cordy echoed that sentiment later in the argument.362 When Mr.
Weisman argued that the state could not be expected to meet its constitu-
357 Id.
358 See, e.g., Hancock, 822 N.E.2d at 1155 (plurality opinion) ("Here, the independent
branches of government have shown that they share the court's concern, and that they are
embracing and acting on their constitutional duty to educate all public school students"); id. at
1158 ("I am confident that the Commonwealth's commitment to educating its children remains
strong, and that the Governor and the Legislature will continue to work expeditiously to 'pro-
vide a high quality public education to every child.'" (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 69, § 1
(2003))).
359 Id. at 1134, 1140.
360 Id. at 1153-54.
361 Audio tape of Hancock Oral Argument, supra note 19.
362 Id. Judge Cordy asked, "If you look at the individual districts and say, 'why aren't
kids learning in these districts?' then you can begin to quantify things. Some may be cost,
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tional obligations without a study to show how much those obligations
would cost, Chief Justice Marshall disagreed. She said that much more
important than a costing out study would be figuring out why individual
school districts and individual students were performing poorly, and that
was not only a matter of money. 363 Similarly, Justice Cordy suggested
that accelerating the Department of Education's assessment of un-
derperforming schools would also be more important than a costing out
study.364 Chief Justice Marshal also stated, "What... comes out to me
loud and clear is that there are real problems in this district that have
nothing to do with money. 365
2. The Commonwealth's Leadership and Success Nationwide
As discussed above, Judge Botsford found that the curriculum
frameworks were world class documents, the teacher certification re-
quirements were among the most rigorous in the country, the school and
district accountability system was one of the first of its kind in the United
States, and the MCAS test was of high quality. 366 The Hancock plurality
noted that the ERA had reduced, eliminated, or reversed spending gaps
between districts based on property wealth,367 and that MCAS scores
were improving in the focus districts. 368 Brockton sixth graders scored
one year and one month ahead of the national average on the Iowa Basic
Skills test in language, six months ahead in math, and on par with the
national average in reading. 369 Judge Botsford also found that Massa-
chusetts students performed at the highest levels on the National Assess-
ment of Educational Progress (NAEP) test.370 In 2002, fourth graders
scored second highest in the nation in writing and highest in reading,
while eighth graders scored higher than students in forty-one other states
in writing and higher than students in thirty-two states in writing.371 In
2003, fourth graders tied for first place in reading and math; eighth grad-
ers tied for first place in reading and second place in math. 372
leadership, curriculum ... why isn't the Department's decision to proceed that way constitu-
tional?" Id.
363 At another point, Chief Justice Marshall again asked why doing a costing-out study
would be important if fixing failing schools was not just about money, but also about district
leadership, capacity, and other areas on which the Department was already focusing. Id.
364 Id.
365 Id.
366 Hancock ex rel. Hancock v. Driscoll (Botsford Report), No. 02-2978, 2004 WL
877984, at *8-19, 113 (Mass. Super. Apr. 26, 2004).
367 Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1147-48 (Mass. 2005).
368 Id. at 1149-50.
369 Id. at 1150.
370 Botsford Report, 2004 WL 877984, at *15.
371 Id.
372 Id.
2008] INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS, POLITICS, AND GOOD FAITH 671
While the court did not specifically state that Massachusetts' rank-
ing among other states influenced its judgment that the Commonwealth
had not violated its constitutional duty, this likely played a role in the
Hancock decision. A number of people interviewed focused on Massa-
chusetts' status as a nationwide education leader.373 Michael Weisman
suggested that the fact that Massachusetts does so well on national rank-
ings might have influenced Hancock.374 Senator Birmingham questioned
how, given the Commonwealth's indisputable success on nationwide
tests and studies, the plaintiffs could argue that the system did not pass
the threshold question of constitutionality. 375 And the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court, in a school finance challenge, found it "of particular inter-
est and significance" that per-pupil expenditure in Rhode Island ranked
sixth highest in the nation and only Hawaii and the District of Columbia
had a more equalized per-pupil expenditure. 376 It is likely that these
types of considerations affected the Hancock court as well.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ROLE OF COURTS IN SOCIAL
CHANGE AND FOR FUTURE SCHOOL
FINANCE LITIGATION
The Hancock decision has important implications for the role of
courts in creating social change-specifically change in schools-and
for plaintiffs that are contemplating school finance lawsuits. A number
of scholars have suggested that courts cannot produce significant social
change in the face of popular opposition. Some have claimed that this is
particularly true in the area of school finance. 377 McDuffy and Hancock
provide partial, nuanced support for these theories but they also point in
a different direction, one that has been less explored: regardless of a
court's capacity to produce social change, a court might be unwilling to
produce change in the face of popular opposition out of concern for judi-
cial role and a fear of provoking inter-branch conflict. This reinforces
the inter-connectedness of courts and the political branches of govern-
ment, especially with regard to school finance. As for implications for
future school finance suits, Hancock shows that courts may be unwilling
to find constitutional liability in states where the political branches have
engaged in a serious, sustained, successful effort to improve education in
plaintiff districts. Hancock also shows that using objective performance
373 Reville Interview, supra note 69; Roney Interview, supra note 178.
374 Weisman Interview, supra note 50.
375 Birmingham Interview, supra note 120. Senator Birmingham noted that in 2005,
Massachusetts fourth and eighth graders scored higher than students in any other state on the
NAEP reading test and tied for first place in math. See id.; Scott Lehigh, Op-Ed, Encouraging
Signs for Education Reform, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 21, 2005, at A17.
376 Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 60-61 (R.I. 1995).
377 See infra Part III.A.
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standards to support findings of educational inadequacy may not be the
"Midas touch" that some scholars have predicted.
A. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ROLE OF COURTS IN CREATING SOCIAL
CHANGE
The McDuffy and Hancock decisions have important implications
for the efficacy of courts in producing social change. In The Hollow
Hope, Gerald Rosenberg argues that United States courts can almost
never effectively produce significant social reform: "at best, they can
second the social reform acts of other branches of government. '378 Due
to the limited nature of constitutional rights, a lack of judicial indepen-
dence, and a lack of implementation power,379 courts can only make an
impact when political, social, and economic forces have already moved
society substantially along a path to reform. Even then, courts may be
merely reflecting societal reform rather than independently furthering
it.380 Therefore, "[t]urning to courts to produce significant social reform
substitutes the myth of American courts for its reality. It credits courts
and judicial decisions with a power that they do not have," 381 allowing
courts to "act as 'fly-paper' for social reformers who succumb to the
'lure of litigation.'-"382
While not as pessimistic, Michael Klarman agrees that court deci-
sions cannot fundamentally alter society. According to Klarman, judges
generally reflect popular opinion and rarely hold views deviating far
from it. Their decisions therefore reflect the dominant opinion of the
time and place. 38 3 As such, litigation will rarely help those most desper-
ately in need; instead, judges are only likely to protect minority groups
that are supported by the majority. 384 "[J]ustices are too much products
of their time and place to launch social revolutions. And, even if they
had the inclination to do so, their capacity to coerce change is too heavily
constrained."385
A number of scholars have applied these and other theories to the
use of the courts to create social change specifically to the school finance
378 ROSENBERG, supra note 20, at 35. While Rosenberg concentrates on the role of the
United States Supreme Court, his conclusions have implications for other courts, including
state supreme courts.
379 These are Rosenberg's three constraints, or the three main reasons why courts will not
be effective change agents. Id. at 10-21.
380 Id. at 5-6.
381 Id. at 338.
382 Id. at 341.
383 KLARMAN, supra note 20, at 6. Professor Klarman also only focuses on the role of the
United States Supreme Court, but his conclusions have implications for state supreme courts as
well.
384 Id. at 449-50.
385 Id. at 468.
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context. Many agree with Rosenberg, arguing that state supreme courts
have failed to substantially reform school finance systems. William
Koski posits that "courts in school finance cases are constrained by their
inability to implement their policy decisions and the risk that their legiti-
macy may be compromised both by a legislative and executive branch
unwilling to comply with the court's mandate. '386 The potential for in-
ter-branch conflict may be particularly high in school finance litigation,
where remedies such as additional funding or programmatic improve-
ments are notoriously difficult to enforce. 387 Therefore, courts might be
in the best position to act when there is consensus among the political
elite that school finance reform is necessary and policymakers merely
require political "cover" from a court decision.388 John Dayton and
Anne Dupre similarly contend that while court decisions may be helpful
or even necessary to produce greater school finance equity, they are not
sufficient. 389 Therefore, if the end goal is to increase or improve funding
for public schools, building political support is essential to producing
meaningful, long-term reform. 390 Others agree, arguing that even when
school finance plaintiffs win in court, judicial remedies are generally in-
adequate and constitutional rights are left under-enforced. 39'
In contrast, Matthew Bosworth argues that courts are effective and
are capable of making and oftentimes do make independent contributions
to education policymaking. 392 After studying school finance litigation in
Kentucky, North Dakota, and Texas, Bosworth concludes that change
would not have been possible in those states without court involvement.
School finance reform advocates did not command a majority or a near
majority in any of those state legislatures before the cases were decided,
and state policymakers credited the courts with producing substantial
change. 393 Ronald Dove also found that without the Kentucky Supreme
Court's order, Kentucky's Education Reform Act of 1990 would not
have passed. 394 Nonetheless, he concluded that "a good litigation strat-
386 Koski, supra note 21, at 1082.
387 Id. at 1095.
388 Id. at 1082.
389 John Dayton & Anne Dupre, School Funding Litigation: Who's Winning the War?, 57
VAND. L. REv. 2351, 2411 (2004).
390 Id.
391 See Note, Unfulfilled Promises: School Finance Remedies and State Courts, 104
HARV. L. REv. 1072, 1078 (1991).
392 MATTHEW H. BOSWORTH, COURTS AS CATALYSTS: STATE SUPREME COURTS AND PUB-
LIC SCHOOL FINANCE EQUITY 25-26 (2001).
393 Id. at 219-20.
394 Ronald G. Dove, Jr., Acorns in a Mountain Pool: The Role of Litigation, Law and
Lawyers in Kentucky Education Reform, 17 J. EDUC. FIN. 83, 116-18.
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egy is not enough; lawyersmust orchestrate a union of political, social
and legal forces in support of their cause." 395
McDuffy and Hancock lend partial support to those who agree with
Professors Rosenberg and Klarman that courts are unable and unlikely to
produce significant social change in the face of popular opposition. They
also demonstrate the inter-connectedness of courts and the political
branches of government. As discussed above, the ERA was passed by
the legislature a week before McDuffy was decided; therefore it cannot
be suggested that the court was creating social change in the face of
legislative or popular opposition. However, the existence of the lawsuit
in part drove the legislation, and the existence of the court order played a
major role in the Act's implementation. Thus, McDuffy can be seen as
part of the broader political education reform effort in Massachusetts, in
which the court and the political branches both played an important role.
Hancock is different because the SJC did not attempt to produce
change. Instead, it refused to act, partially out of fear of provoking inter-
branch conflict. This fear was grounded in the court's implicit belief that
there was a lack of political support for the plaintiffs' proposed remedies.
While the willingness, rather than the capacity, of courts to produce
change has not received sustained scholarly attention, some school fi-
nance scholars have addressed how courts perceive their own institu-
tional competence and how that perception might affect a court's
willingness to attempt to produce change. William Koski contends that
judges engage in an "overtly political analysis" whereby they consider if
political elites support education finance reform. 396 If they do not,
judges may reflect on the fact that unpopular court decisions can be ig-
nored and can ultimately undermine court legitimacy and effective-
ness. 397 Judges may fear that their institutional legitimacy will be called
into question and may therefore refuse to intervene in the education poli-
cymaking of the political branches. 398 Michael Heise agrees, suggesting
that because court decisions might not be able to change school finance
outcomes, courts might choose not to "pick a potential constitutional
395 Id.
396 Koski, supra note 21, at 1228.
397 Id. at 1090, 1101.
398 Id. at 1228-29. Koski explains that this appears to have been the case in Ohio. See id.
at 1229. Plaintiffs claimed that the legislature had failed to comply with the court's earlier
order to create a constitutional system of school financing. See DeRolph v. State, 754 N.E.2d
1184, 1195-96 (Ohio 2001). The court did not find that the legislature was in compliance or
that the system was constitutional, but refused to act nonetheless. The court explained, "None
of us is completely comfortable with the decision we announce in this opinion. But ... we
have reached the point where, while continuing to hold our previously expressed opinions, the
greater good requires us to recognize 'the necessity of sacrificing our opinions sometimes to
the opinions of others for the sake of harmony.' . . . In that spirit, we have created the consen-
sus that should terminate the role of this court in the dispute." Id. at 1189-90.
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fight when the outcome is not obvious. ' 399 Similarly, George Brown
suggests that state supreme courts may fear the political consequences of
ordering explicit remedies in school finance cases because they fear di-
rect conflict with the legislative branch. 400 Michael Heise also points out
that courts may have one view of their institutional role when it comes to
articulating a constitutional right to an education and another view when
it comes to ordering a specific remedy. 40'
Hancock provides support for and goes beyond these theories. As
discussed above, during oral argument, Justice Greaney asked what the
court was supposed to do if it ordered the legislature to implement a
remedy and the legislature refused. He explained that before making
constitutional orders, courts must consider how they are going to enforce
the orders. Greaney specifically referred to the SJC's remedial orders in
the clean elections case and the "stalemate" that ensued between the
court and the legislature. 40 2 Hancock therefore points towards the impor-
tance of focusing on the willingness, rather than merely on the capacity,
of courts to produce significant social change and the interconnectedness
of courts and legislatures. In Hancock, the court's hesitance seems to
stem from its experience with previous inter-branch conflicts and its as-
sessment of the lack of political support for additional funding for poor
school districts. However, this is surely only one of many factors. More
research is necessary to understand the conditions under which courts
might fear imposing social change in the face of popular or legislative
opposition. Similarly, Hancock suggests that school finance attorneys
and all attorneys who urge courts to create social change must focus on
the legislative sphere in addition to the judicial sphere. This is true not
only in terms of winning political support from the legislative and execu-
tive branches, but also then conveying that support back to the court. If
courts are going to, in part, base their willingness to act on their percep-
tion of the political support for a given issue, then attorneys must focus
on presenting courts with evidence that the political branches and the
public support their cause and their requested relief.40 3
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR SCHOOL FINANCE SUITS
Hancock also has important implications for those contemplating
bringing school finance suits. The most important lesson is that advo-
cates should be wary of bringing school finance cases in states where the
legislature has created a foundation budget or some other form of guar-
399 Heise, supra note 176, at 98.
400 Brown, supra note 176, at 554.
401 Heise, supra note 176, at 94.
402 See supra Part II.A.
403 The plaintiffs did not do this successfully in Hancock.
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anteed funding and has made a good faith effort to improve educational
opportunities in plaintiff districts and equalize per-pupil spending among
districts. This remains true even when students in plaintiff districts fail
to meet state standards and perform well below average on state man-
dated performance evaluations. These two lessons are discussed in turn.
1. Legislative Good Faith Effort and Success
A few school finance scholars have theorized that a court will not
find that a state has violated its constitutional duty if it has genuinely
tried to equalize per-pupil funding or otherwise guarantee that students
receive an adequate education. Jonathan Banks argues that "[o]nly when
courts conclude that their legislature is unwilling or unable to pass effec-
tive remedial legislation will they intervene. ' '4°4 After studying a num-
ber of school finance decisions, he found that frustration with legislative
inaction was a factor in every case that plaintiffs won. 40 5 Therefore
"frustration with the legislature may be the real key to successful finance
reform challenges. '40 6 This may be even more true for remedial litiga-
tion such as Hancock. George Brown explains that, like McDuffy, many
courts initially issue a finding of constitutional liability without specify-
ing a remedy. "This situation puts the court in a difficult position if the
matter returns to it, a distinct possibility in school finance cases. To the
extent that the legislature has tried to follow the court's advice, it will be
difficult to strike down that action. '407
This makes sense on a theoretical level and is practically supported
by Hancock. Theoretically courts should not get involved in education
policy unless the legislative and executive branches have proven incapa-
ble of addressing or unwilling to address constitutional violations. Prac-
tically, there are two reasons why this is so. First, if the legislative and
executive branches have engaged in a serious effort to improve educa-
tional outcomes, like in Hancock, then support for a plaintiff's adequacy
suit among policy elites, the public, and the political branches will likely
be lacking. As discussed above, this could mean that a court will be
unable to achieve real reform or unwilling to even attempt reform out of
fear of inter-branch conflict. Second, even if a court does not fear inter-
branch conflict, it might be unwilling to get involved in a school finance
lawsuit if it thinks that the political branches of government have taken
their constitutional responsibilities seriously and are on the right path to
success because it might believe its involvement is unnecessary. As dis-
404 Jonathan Banks, State Constitutional Analyses of Public School Finance Reform
Cases: Myth or Methodology?, 45 VJAND. L. Rav. 129, 154-55 (1992).
405 Id. at 155.
406 Id. at 157.
407 Brown, supra note 176, at 566.
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cussed above, the Hancock plurality opinion was adamant that the Com-
monwealth had made a serious, good faith effort to improve education in
the plaintiff districts ,and was on the correct path to success. The opinion
specifically contrasted Massachusetts' experience with New Jersey's,
where the Abbott court determined that its involvement was necessary
only after years of legislative recalcitrance. 40 8 Therefore, advocates
should be wary of bringing school finance suits in states where there is a
perception that the political branches have acted in good faith to fulfill
their constitutional obligations.
2. Adequacy Suits and Objective Performance Measures
This counseled hesitance towards school finance litigation in states
that have not been plagued by legislative inaction or recalcitrance is no
less true when objective state performance measures support the plain-
tiffs' case. Many scholars have proposed that using accountability mea-
sures to support adequacy litigation may be a successful new approach
for school finance plaintiffs.409 Michael Heise contends that the stan-
dards movement made it easier for plaintiffs to win school finance suits
by allowing plaintiffs to define adequate funding as the level of funding
necessary for all school districts and students to meet state education
standards. 410 "Thus, a new wave of litigation may be upon us, one that
turns the states' efforts to improve achievement through standards
against the state and enables school districts to gain financially from their
inability to perform at desired levels. '411 John Dayton and Anne Dupre
suggest that using outcome-based standards might give school funding
plaintiffs "the 'Midas touch' as they attempt to turn student performance
failure into gold. ' ' 4 12 Molly McUsic comments that adequacy claims
owe their growing success to the standards movement because it saved
plaintiffs and judges from having to define the content of an adequate
education.4 13 Similarly, Thomas Saunders counsels that plaintiffs can
408 See supra Part II.C.1.
409 Paul Reville pointed out the irony of this situation. School finance plaintiffs are often
the people who are most vehemently opposed to accountability measures. However, in ade-
quacy litigation, accountability measures are often helpful and are therefore embraced by
plaintiffs who decry them in other aspects of their work. Reville Interview, supra note 69.
410 Michael Heise, Educational Jujitsu: How School Finance Lawyers Learned to Turn
Standards and Accountability into Dollars, EDUc. NEXT, Fall 2002, at 31, 32.
411 Id.
412 Dayton & Dupre, supra note 389, at 2397.
413 Molly S. McUsic, The Laws' Role in the Distribution of Education: The Promises and
Pitfalls of School Finance Litigation, in LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM: Six STRATEGIES FOR
PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 88, 91 (Jay P. Heubert ed., 1999).
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rely on the failure to meet state standards to secure relief under a consti-
tutional Education Clause.4 14
Some commentators have recognized potential problems with hold-
ing states liable whenever students or districts fail to meet objective per-
formance criteria. James S. Liebman asks, "[A]re judges likely-and
should they be encouraged-to interpret every expression of aspirational
educational policy as an enforceable commitment[?] ''415 However, Tico
Almeida suggests that in the age of "high-stakes testing," when failure to
perform satisfactorily on state tests can mean non-promotion or inability
to graduate high school, "courts may no longer be able to claim credibly
that state education standards constitute only aspirational goals" and
should not be enforced in adequacy suits. 4 16
Hancock proves that some courts may refuse to hold states responsi-
ble for objective student performance outcomes as long as the state has
acted in good faith to improve education in plaintiff districts. Judge Bot-
sford found that the curriculum frameworks defined the content of the
Commonwealth's constitutional duty to provide students with an educa-
tion, and "[t]he... MCAS test was developed in response to the ERA's
mandate that a system of student assessments be created. '4 17 She found
that none of the plaintiff districts were implementing the curriculum
frameworks for all students or equipping all students with the McDuffy
capabilities. 418 In addition, in 2003, 18 to 29% of tenth graders in the
four focus districts failed the MCAS ELA test; 32 to 47% failed the
mathematics test.4 19 These scores were lower than the state average and
significantly lower than the scores in the comparison districts.420 In that
same year, due to MCAS scores, Brockton did not make Adequate
Yearly Progress (AYP) in mathematics, Lowell did not make AYP in
ELA, Springfield did not make AYP in ELA or math, and Winchendon
did not make AYP in ELA or math for the student subgroups of special
education and free/reduced-price lunch.421
The Hancock court accepted Judge Botsford's findings but did not
hold that the Commonwealth was violating its constitutional duty to
414 Thomas Saunders, Settling Without "Settling": School Finance Litigation and Gov-
ernance Reform in Maryland, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 571, 579 (2004).
415 James S. Liebman, Implementing Brown in the Nineties: Political Reconstruction, Lib-
eral Recollection, and Litigatively Enforced Legislative Reform, 76 VA. L. REV. 349, 384-85
(1990).
416 Tico A. Almeida, Refocusing School Finance Litigation on At-Risk Children: Leandro
v. State of North Carolina, 22 YALE L. & POL'y Rav. 525, 547 (2004).
417 Hancock ex rel. Hancock v. Driscoll (Botsford Report), No. 02-2978, 2004 WL
877984, at *8, 16 (Mass. Super. Apr. 26, 2004).
418 Id. at *143.
419 See id. at *113.
420 Id.
421 Id. at *114-15.
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cherish the interests of public schools. 422 The fact that the MCAS test
was "high stakes," in that in order to graduate from high school a Massa-
chusetts student must pass the ELA and math portions of the test, was not
even discussed. Likewise, the court did not find it constitutionally prob-
lematic or even relevant that students in plaintiff districts failed to meet
state standards. Therefore, predictions that standards-based reform or
state accountability measures will become a "Midas touch" for plaintiffs
in adequacy lawsuits are overblown. The Hancock court was far more
interested in the efforts made by the Commonwealth than in the out-
comes achieved by students in plaintiff districts.
CONCLUSION
School finance reformers in Massachusetts have much debated the
consequences of the Hancock decision. Some see Hancock as the worst
possible loss, a decision that the Massachusetts legislature has taken as
the SJC's "imprimatur to produce budgets without any education initia-
tives. '423 Others see hope in the fact that a majority of the court reaf-
firmed McDuffy and all seven justices adopted Judge Botsford's
findings.424 Michael Weisman went as far as to call Hancock "relatively
insignificant from a legal perspective. ' 425 Current Massachusetts Gover-
nor Deval Patrick clearly does not understand Hancock to be permission
from the SJC to ignore school funding. He appointed a task force, lead
by Paul Reville, to advise him on a number of education issues, including
school finance, and announced his interest in reexamining the state's
school financing scheme, stating, "The property tax is not working. '426
On June 1, 2007, during a commencement address at the University of
Massachusetts at Boston, Patrick announced a comprehensive education
reform plan, calling for universal preschool, full-day kindergarten, and a
longer school day and year for Massachusetts public schools. 427 He also
appointed Judge Botsford to the Supreme Judicial Court; she was sworn
in on September 4, 2007.428
422 Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1138-39 (Mass. 2005).
423 Birmingham Interview, supra note 120. Judge Botsford agreed and said that the great-
est tragedy of Hancock was that education reform would not happen without pressure from the
court. Botsford Interview, supra note 207.
424 See Blum Interview, supra note 125. Joanne Blum also explained that the MTA used
Hancock in its early negotiations with current Massachusetts Governor, Deval Patrick. The
message was, "you guys aren't really off the hook. The hook may not be as big as we hoped it
would be, but you still have a constitutional obligation." Id.
425 See Weisman Interview, supra note 50.
426 Wangsness, supra note 17, at Al.
427 Sacchetti, Governor Stirs Graduates, supra note 17, at B 1; Patrick Seeks Free Two-
Year State Colleges, Goal is Key in "Cradle to Career" Plan, BOSTON GLOBE, June 1, 2007, at
Al.
428 See LeBlanc, supra note 207.
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Yet, despite the Governor's interest in education reform and fi-
nance, the power of the ambiguity surrounding the McDuffy standard as a
tool for motivating political leaders has been lost. Senator Birmingham
explained that after McDuffy was decided, it was unclear whether the
court would try to enforce the seven McDuffy capabilities or whether the
capabilities were merely aspirational. 429 The uncertainty was used as a
prod to convince legislators to do more to ensure that all children re-
ceived an adequate education as defined by the court. This was particu-
larly helpful during the implementation of the ERA. However, Hancock
removed this tool when it clarified that the McDuffy capabilities were not
enforceable and that the legislature would be judged based on effort, not
results.430 Most legislators responded: "[g]reat, we don't need to worry
about this. We have enough other things competing for the dime .... If
the court says we can get to it later, we'll get to it later. ''431
There is also speculation that Springfield, one of the focus districts
in Hancock, might bring another school finance suit.432 However, any-
one considering school finance litigation, or any type of litigation that
urges a court to create social change, should first look closely at the
lessons of McDuffy and Hancock.
Both McDuffy and Hancock illustrate the inter-connectedness of
courts and politics. McDuffy shows that it is possible for courts to create
social change, or at least to be an important part of a larger social change
movement, when there is substantial political support for change among
policy elites, the public, and the political branches of government. Be-
tween 1993 and 2002, state aid to Massachusetts public schools in-
creased from approximately $1.6 billion to $4 billion,433 spending gaps
between districts were reversed or reduced, 434 and schools experienced
fewer of the extreme resource shortages that were hallmarks of the pre-
McDuffy era. Most people would agree that many Massachusetts schools
tangibly changed during this period. On the other hand, Hancock dem-
onstrates that courts might intentionally avoid attempting to create
change out of fear of provoking inter-branch conflict or concerns regard-
ing judicial role. This type of concern will only be neutralized if there is
substantial political support for the plaintiffs' remedies. This too demon-
strates the inter-relatedness of courts and politics when it comes to
school finance.
429 See Birmingham Interview, supra note 120.
430 See id.
431 Barrios Interview, supra note 299.
432 See Botsford Interview, supra note 207.
433 See Hancock ex rel. Hancock v. Driscoll (Botsford Report), No. 02-2978, 2004 WL
877984, at *8 (Mass. Super. Apr. 26, 2004).
434 Id. at * 14.
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Lastly, Hancock establishes that even where institutional constraints
are not relevant, such as in finding a constitutional violation rather than
ordering a judicial remedy, courts might refuse to impose constitutional
liability if they perceive that the legislative and executive branches of
government have undertaken a serious, good-faith effort to minimize
funding disparities and improve education in underperforming school
districts, and are on the path to success. This will be true even in cases
where plaintiffs can rely on objective performance data to show that chil-
dren in their districts are not being provided with the state-required edu-
cation. Therefore, advocates should be wary of bringing social change
litigation in states where there is a perception that the political branches
have acted in good faith to fulfill their constitutional obligations. They
should also consider whether, given the political contexts of their partic-
ular states, even a successful school finance lawsuit will lead to a tangi-
ble improvement for students.

